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INTRODUCTION
[T]he question is, what do they mean when they allowed recovery of
these costs of response by any person, consistent with the National Con-
tingency Plan? And I looked at it and, frankly, I would not say that this
is the most clear language that Congress has ever enacted. It is not easy
to make some sense out of it. . . .
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA), a broadly defined group of landowners,
transporters, and generators of hazardous waste are liable for the costs of
cleaning up hazardous waste sites.2 CERCLA provides the government
with powerful tools to impose this liability. The United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to compel responsible
parties to clean up the site, or the government may clean up the site itself
and recover its expenses from these parties. 3
The government is not the only party, however, that can impose
1. Homart Dev. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1357, 1358
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (Judge Schwarzer, during oral arguments, discussing meaning of section
107(a)(4)(B)).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). See infra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
CERCLA also applies to the release of hazardous substances that are not wastes. See infra
notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
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liability for hazardous waste cleanup costs. Section 107(a)(4)(B) of
CERCLA provides that responsible parties are also "liable for. . . any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan."' 4 This new cause of action creates a
significant role for private parties in the national hazardous waste
cleanup effort. Private individuals, ranging from owners of sites with
hazardous wastes, to neighbors of such sites, to parties potentially subject
to government cleanup orders, now have a powerful incentive to respond
to hazardous waste problems without prior government action. Private
parties who voluntarily undertake hazardous waste cleanups may be able
to recoup their expenses.
The stakes involved in implementing section 107(a)(4)(B) are high.
Section 107(a)(4)(B) will have significant economic consequences for any
commercial activity involving hazardous substances. The new cause of
action, for example, has the potential to redefine, independent of contract
or common law, established liabilities between such groups as real estate
vendors and purchasers. Additionally, section 107(a)(4)(B) may have
significant environmental consequences. A broad right of recovery may
encourage private hazardous waste cleanup activity, but inadequately su-
pervised cleanups may in fact be environmentally damaging.
Although the courts have begun to resolve difficult questions regard-
ing liability under CERCLA, it is the Environmental Protection Agency
that has primary responsibility for defining the private cleanup require-
ments under section 107(a)(4)(B). 5 Section 107(a)(4)(B) requires that all
private party cleanups be "consistent with" the National Contingency
Plan (NCP) as a prerequisite to cost recovery. EPA is responsible for
publishing this plan, which identifies the requirements for a proper haz-
ardous waste cleanup. In recently published revisions of the NCP, EPA
has specified the conditions that private parties must satisfy in order for
their cleanups to be found consistent with the NCP.
Court decisions and the revisions of the NCP are making the re-
quirements for private party cleanups under section 107(a)(4)(B) more
certain, but the future of such cleanups remains in some doubt. A review
of EPA decisions indicates that the Agency has selected a questionable
course in its attempts to balance the dual goals of encouraging private
cleanup activity and ensuring adequate supervision of the difficult and
4. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
5. The courts' role in resolving liability issues such as joint and several liability, an issue
Congress left to "traditional and evolving principles" of tort law (see infra note 7, and notes
24-29 and accompanying text), has led some commentators to refer to CERCLA as a "return
to common law." See, e.g., J. BONNIE & T. MCFARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: CASES-LEGISLATION-POLICIES ch. 8.e (1984). As these questions are resolved,
however, EPA's role in defining the requirements for hazardous waste cleanup, through pro-
mulgation of the National Contingency Plan, should increasingly focus attention on the regu-
latory aspects of CERCLA.
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controversial process of hazardous waste removal. Additionally, several
practical constraints on the use of section 107(a)(4)(B), such as proce-
dural obstacles to an early determination of whether private cleanup
plans are consistent with the NCP, may unnecessarily discourage private
cleanup efforts.
This Article examines issues raised by the section 107(a)(4)(B) pri-
vate cause of action. Section I provides an overview of the provisions of
CERCLA that are essential to understanding the issues under section
107(a)(4)(B). Section II addresses the threshold question of whether sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B) does, in fact, provide an independent cause of action for
recovery of hazardous waste cleanup costs. Almost without exception,
courts have concluded that it does. Section III examines the require-
ments for asserting the cause of action. Issues examined range from
standing requirements to questions of ripeness. The most difficult ques-
tions, however, may involve the requirement that private cleanups be
"consistent with the national contingency plan." EPA's recent revisions
to this national cleanup plan attempt to provide some control over pri-
vate cleanup efforts. Section IV discusses significant problems that may
constrain parties from undertaking private hazardous waste cleanups.
I
OVERVIEW OF CERCLA
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act was adopted in 1980, during the closing days of the 96th
Congress.6 In many respects the product of compromise and confusion, 7
6. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657(1982)). Spurred
by a growing national concern with the problem of hazardous wastes, the House and Senate
had struggled with the complex and politically controversial elements of a national hazardous
waste cleanup statute. Prior federal environmental legislation touched at the fringes of the
problem but failed to provide the necessary tools to deal effectively with existing hazardous
waste sites. With a new President and a new Congress waiting to take office in the next month,
the 96th Congress, in an extraordinary move, passed one of the country's most significant
environmental statutes as a Senate amendment to a House Resolution, under a suspension of
the rules that precluded amendments. No conference was held on the bill, and hence there is
no conference report on the statute as enacted. The legislative history, such as it is, is limited
to sometimes contradictory floor debates and the Senate and House reports on predecessor
bills which were not adopted. See generally ENVTL. L. INST., I SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY xiii-xxii (1982); Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1
(1982); Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous Waste Control, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
253 (1981).
7. See supra note 6. As might be expected with such a history, the provisions of
CERCLA leave open as many questions as they answer. In many cases, Congress deliberately
chose ambiguity as the price of adopting any legislation. One court described CERCLA as "a
severely diminished piece of compromise legislation from which a number of significant fea-
tures were deleted." City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D.
Pa. 1982). The standard of liability, for example, is not explicitly defined. Citing the legisla-
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CERCLA nonetheless has evolved into an extraordinarily powerful tool
to ensure the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Although the actual
cleanup effort has been slower than many would have hoped, CERCLA
remains a basic component of the government's efforts to clean up haz-
ardous waste sites.
CERCLA contains a number of closely interrelated provisions,
which together provide a comprehensive series of options for the cleanup
of hazardous waste. The Act is far from a model of clarity, and courts
and EPA have been struggling to interpret and integrate the separate
elements of CERCLA.8 Because of the close relationship among the var-
ious elements of CERCLA, it is impossible to understand the private
cause of action under section 107(a)(4)(B) without understanding other
basic aspects of the Act as well.
A. Hazardous Substances
Section 107 of CERCLA imposes liability for cleanup costs associ-
ated with the release of a "hazardous substance."9 A substance may be
designated as a "hazardous substance" under CERCLA in one of two
ways. First, the Act provides that substances designated as toxic or haz-
ardous under certain other environmental statutes, including the Clean
Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, and the Toxic Substance Control Act, are also hazardous substances
tive history, courts have construed liability under section 107 to be joint and several, even
though an explicit provision calling for joint and several liability was deleted from the final
Act. This history indicates that Congress intended the courts to fill in many of the gaps by
utilizing "traditional and evolving principles of common law." United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 806-07 (S.D. Ohio 1983). See also Dore, The Standard of Civil Liabil-
ity for Hazardous Waste Disposal Activity: Some Quirks in Superfund, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW.
260 (1981).
8. See generally W. FRANK & T. ATKESON, SUPERFUND: LITIGATION AND CLEANUP
(A BNA Special Report) (1985); J. ARBUCKLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK (8th ed.
1985); J. CASLER & S. RAMSEY, SUPERFUND HANDBOOK (1985); Comment, CERCLA Litiga-
tion Update: The Emerging Law of Generator Liability, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.)l0,224 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 CERCLA Update].
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Additionally (as discussed infra notes 13-15 and accompanying
text), section 104 authorizes the government to undertake cleanup efforts financed by
Superfund not only when there is a release or threat of release of a "hazardous substance," but
also when- there is a release or threat of release of "any pollutant or contaminant which may
present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare." CERCLA
§ 104(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(B). Although the government may be authorized to
clean up such pollutants, section 107 appears to authorize the recovery of private response
costs only for the cleanup of previously designated "hazardous substances." Cf. CERCLA
§ 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
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under CERCLA.' 0 Second, EPA may directly designate a substance as
hazardous if it "may present a substantial danger to the public health or
welfare or the environment."" Although this Article refers to the
cleanup of hazardous wastes and hazardous waste sites, it is important to
note that, unlike the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, CER-
CLA applies to hazardous substances even if they are not "wastes." 12
B. Government Cleanup Options
Under CERCLA, the government has two options to ensure the
cleanup of hazardous wastes. First, pursuant to section 104, the govern-
ment may itself undertake the cleanup of a site in cases where there has
been a release or threat of release of a hazardous substance, or where
there has been a release of other pollutants or contaminants that may
present an "imminent and substantial danger to public health or wel-
fare."' 13 Subject to certain constraints, these section 104 cleanup efforts
10. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). CERCLA defines hazardous wastes to
include substances that:
(A) have been designated as hazardous substances under section 311 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A);
(B) have been designated as hazardous pursuant to section 102 of CERCLA;
(C) have been designated as hazardous wastes under section 3001 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6921;
(D) have been designated as toxic under section 307(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1317(a);
(E) are hazardous air pollutants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(b); or
(F) are imminently hazardous pollutants under section 7 of TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2606.
Id. CERCLA specifically excludes from the definition of "hazardous substance"
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifi-
cally listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through
(F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids,
liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and
such synthetic gas).
CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). Cf CERCLA § 104(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(2).
11. CERCLA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a).
12. The definition of "waste" generally involves the issue of whether a substance is a
"discarded material," and this definition of waste has proved to be one of the most difficult
questions under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.1-.2
(1985). See generally 50 Fed. Reg. 614, 617-43 (1985) (preamble discussion of comments re-
ceived on proposed definition of solid waste). This issue may not have to be addressed under
CERCLA. For example, a hazardous substance such as a pesticide that is released into the
environment may be subject to CERCLA even if it has not been discarded.
Just in case this appears to be getting too easy, persons applying pesticides in accordance
with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act are specifically exempted from
CERCLA liability under section 107(h). CERCLA, however, gives the government the au-
thority to respond under section 104; the government simply could not recover its expenses
from the pesticide users. See Comment, Using CERCLA to Clean Up Groundwater Contami-
nated Through the Normal Use of Pesticides, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,100
(1985).
13. CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a). CERCLA provides, however, that the gov-
ernment is not to undertake such cleanup if it "determines that such removal and remedial
action will be done properly by the owner or operator of the vessel or facility from which the
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are financed by Superfund.14 Under the Act, the government can recoup
its expenses, and hence replenish Superfund, through an action to re-
cover these response costs from responsible parties.
15
Alternatively, the government can, under section 106 of the Act,
compel private parties to clean up the site themselves. 16 These orders
may be issued in cases where there is an "imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance," and they are
normally issued by EPA as administrative orders.17 The Act does not
specify to whom these orders may be issued. Although persons who are
"responsible parties" under section 107(a) are the primary target for such
orders, the government has asserted the authority to issue these orders to
virtually anyone where necessary to protect the public or the environ-
ment. 18 CERCLA does not expressly provide private parties with the
right to a hearing on the administrative order before compliance is re-
quired, and penalties for failure to comply with a government cleanup
order are substantial. 19 As might be expected, the section 106 order has
release or threat of release emanates, or by any other responsible party." Id. See generally J.
ARBUCKLE, supra note 8, at 113; W. FRANK & T. ATKESON, supra note 8, at 9.
14. Superfund, more properly called the Hazardous Substance Response Fund, was a
$1.6 billion fund created to finance the cleanup of hazardous substances. Section III of
CERCLA specifies the uses of the Fund, including financing government cleanups and, in
some cases, reimbursing private cleanups. 42 U.S.C. § 9611. See infra notes 65-71 and accom-
panying text.
Title II of CERCLA amended the Internal Revenue Code to impose a tax on petroleum
and 42 listed chemicals. Hazardous Substance Response Revenue Act-of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
510, §§ 201-232, 94 Stat. 2767, 2796-804 (1980). These taxes provided 87.5% of the Fund; the
remainder came from general revenues. Additionally, money recovered by the government
under CERCLA and section 311 of the Clean Water Act, and penalties collected under
CERCLA, were added to the Fund. CERCLA § 221(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(1). As of this
writing, authorization for the Fund has expired, and Congress still has not reauthorized the
Act. See [17 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 139 (June 6, 1986).
Among other limitations on the use of Superfund, the government cannot undertake a
Fund-financed remedial action under section 104 unless the state in which the release occurred
has agreed with the federal government that the state will ensure long-term maintenance of the
response action, ensure availability of approved hazardous waste disposal facilities, and pay at
least 10% of the cost of the action. CERCLA § 104(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3).
15. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). See EPA Memorandum on
Cost Recovery Actions under CERCLA (Aug. 26, 1983), reprinted in [41 Federal Laws Index]
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2861 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Cost Recovery Memo].
16. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). See generally EPA Memorandum on Use
and Issuance of Administrative Orders under Section 106(a) of CERCLA (Sept. 9, 1983),
reprinted in [41 Federal Laws Index] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2931 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Section 106 Memo]; W. FRANK & T. ATKESON, supra note 8, at 27-33; Note, Section 106 of
CERCLA: An Alternative to Superfund Liability, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 381 (1985).
17. CERCLA § 106(a). Federal district courts can also issue cleanup orders. Id.
18. In its memorandum on use and issuance of section 106 orders, the Agency stated: "In
addition, in appropriate cases, it may be possible to issue orders to parties other than those
listed in Section 107(a), if actions by such parties are necessary to protect the public or the
environment." Section 106 Memo, supra note 16, at 2933.
19. If a party fails to comply with an administrative order, it is potentially liable for fines
1986]
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
become the major tool in the government's cleanup efforts. 20
C. Potentially Responsible Parties
Section 107 of CERCLA defines the group of people who are poten-
tially liable for government and private party cleanup costs. 21 Liability
extends to: (1) current owners of hazardous waste sites; (2) prior owners
who owned the site at the time of hazardous waste disposal; (3) genera-
tors of hazardous waste who arranged for disposal of their wastes at the
site; and (4) transporters of hazardous waste who selected the site for
disposal. 22 These parties are potentially liable for government and pri-
vate cleanup costs and for damages to natural resources.2 3
Under the Act, these "potentially responsible parties" or "PRP's"
are subject to a standard of strict liability. Although the Act does not
specifically provide for strict liability, it does provide that the term "lia-
ble" shall be construed the same as the standard of liability under section
311 of the Clean Water Act.24 Courts had previously construed section
of up to $5000 per day pursuant to section 106(b) and treble the amount of the actual cleanup
costs under section 107(c)(3). As EPA noted with its characteristic humor: "In view of the
magnitude of these penalties, the Agency expects that the regulated community will comply
with administrative Orders." Section 106 Memo, supra note 16, at 2931. Some questions
have, however, been raised about the constitutionality of imposing such penalties in the ab-
sence of pre-enforcement review. See infra note 213.
20. In its memorandum on use and issuance of section 106 orders, the Agency observed:
"The administrative order authority which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exer-
cises under 106(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 (CERCLA). . . is one of the most potent administrative remedies available to
the Agency under any existing environmental statute." Section 106 Memo, supra note 16, at
2931. See also 47 Fed. Reg. 20,663, 20,664 (1982) (government policy on the use of imminent
and substantial endangerment authority).
21. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See generally W. FRANK & T. ATKESON,
supra note 8, at 35-36.
22. CERCLA § 107(a). See W. FRANK & T. ATKESON, supra note 8, at 34-37; 1984
CERCLA Update, supra note 8. See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d
Cir. 1985). In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
846 (W.D. Mo. 1984), a transporter of hazardous waste was held liable under section
107(a)(4). Liability was also imposed on the corporate defendant because of its status as an
"owner and operator" under section 107(a)(1). Id. at 849. And, finally, a defendant corporate
vice president was held liable under section 107(a)(3) for his direct responsibility in arranging
for waste disposal. Id. at 847.
23. CERCLA § 107(a). The Act, however, defines "natural resources" to include only
resources "belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled
by the United States . . . . any State or local government, or any foreign government."
CERCLA § 101(16), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). See CERCLA Natural Resource Claims Proce-
dures, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,205, 51,215-19 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 306.10-.41) (regula-
tions governing claims against Superfund for natural resource damages). See generally
Menefee, Recovery for Natural Resource Damages under Superfund: The Role of the Rebutta-
ble Presumption, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 15,057 (1982).
24. CERCLA § 101(32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32). Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1321 (1982), imposes liability for the discharge of oil or hazardous substances into
navigable waters. See generally J. ARBUCKLE, supra note 8, at 306-09; W. RODGERS, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW 499-507 (1977).
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311 to impose a standard of strict liability,25 and this standard has been
applied to liability under CERCLA.26 The Act itself provides only a lim-
ited number of statutory defenses to liability, including that the release
was caused solely by an act of God, by an act of war, or, in narrow
circumstances, by a third party. 27
Virtually every court that has considered the issue has also con-
cluded that the Act provides for some form of joint and several liability
among responsible parties.28 Thus, each of the PRP's may be liable for
the entire cost of cleaning up a site notwithstanding that the party con-
tributed a relatively small amount of waste to the site or, in the case of a
current owner, contributed no waste at all. Indeed, at least one court has
concluded that a generator of waste who disposes of some hazardous
waste at a site is liable for all cleanup costs at the site if there is a release
of any hazardous substance placed there by any generator.29 Suffice it to
say that liability under CERCLA is broad and stringent.
D. National Contingency Plan
A basic element of CERCLA is the National Contingency Plan
(NCP). Section 105 of the Act requires EPA to promulgate the NCP in
order to "establish procedures and standards for responding to releases
25. See, e.g., United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981); Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d
609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979).
26. In City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the
court noted:
The legislative history clearly establishes Congress' understanding that it was incor-
porating a standard of strict liability into CERCLA. See, e.g., 126 Cong. Rec. S14964
(daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph) ("[w]e have kept strict liability
in the compromise, specifying the standard of liability under section 311 of the Clean
Water Act. . ."); 126 Cong. Rec. HI 1787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Florio) ("[t]he standard of liability in these amendments is intended to be the same as
that provided in section 311 of the [Clean Water Act]; that is, strict liability").
Id. at 1140 n.4. See also Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1042; Northeastern Pharmaceutical,
579 F. Supp. at 843.
27. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). Cf Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1042;
United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1985) (triable issues on third
party defense to liability); United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354
(D.N.M. 1984) (section 107(b) third party defense to liability not available when contractual
relationship exists between primary defendant and third party). Additional non-statutory de-
fenses may also be available. See infra note 222.
28. See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 844-45; United States v. A &
F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-55 (S.D. I1. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F.
Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807-
08 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Courts have also held, however, that where a proper basis for allocation
of responsibility exists, joint and several liability will not be applied; courts have differed on the
level of proof necessary to justify application of individual rather than joint and several liabil-
ity. See, e.g., A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. at 1256-57; Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1338;
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 811. See generally Note, Joint and Several Liability for
Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund, 68 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1195 (1982).
29. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1333.
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of hazardous substances, pollutants and contaminants. ' 30 The NCP is
intended to provide guidance for implementation of cleanup actions; vir-
tually all activities undertaken pursuant to the Act must be consistent
with the plan.3' The provisions of the NCP dealing with CERCLA were
first promulgated in July 1982.32 In November 1985, EPA promulgated
a major set of revisions to the NCP; these revisions address a number of
key issues relating to hazardous waste cleanups under CERCLA and
simplify some of the procedural requirements for undertaking a cleanup
effort.33
Subpart F of the NCP, the "National Hazardous Substance Re-
sponse Plan," specifies the basic requirements for the cleanup of hazard-
ous waste sites under CERCLA.34 This subpart identifies the steps that
government and private parties are to take when responding to the re-
lease of hazardous substances. These steps include study of the site, de-
velopment of alternative cleanup strategies, and selection of a cleanup
plan from among those alternatives. Although the decision on every
cleanup is site-specific, the NCP mandates that pertain procedural and
substantive factors be addressed in developing and implementing the final
plan.
30. CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605. The NCP is codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 300
(1985).
3 1. EPA has described the NCP as the "blueprint" for implementing cleanup authority
under CERCLA. W. FRANK & T. ATKESON, supra note 8, at 10. Section 105 provides that
following publication of the NCP, "the response to and actions to minimize damage from
hazardous substance releases shall, to the greatest extent possible, be in accordance with the
provisions of the plan." 42 U.S.C. § 9605.
32. The National Contingency Plan was first established in 1968 as an interagency agree-
ment and was subsequently codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, pursuant to the Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1979. In 1972, Congress gave the President the responsibility for
preparing the NCP, in section 311 of what is now called the Clean Water Act. See 45 Fed.
Reg. 17,832, 17,833 (1980). Section 311 specifies liability for the discharge of oil and hazard-
ous substances, and the NCP was designed to provide guidance for the cleanup of these sub-
stances. See supra note 24. In section 105 of CERCLA, Congress required EPA to revise the
NCP to deal also with the release of hazardous substances subject to the Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605.
The Agency was somewhat slow in revising the NCP after the adoption of CERCLA, but
spurred on by litigation, the Agency promulgated the first revision of the NCP pursuant to
CERCLA in July 1982; it has been amended several times since then. See 40 C.F.R. Part 300
(1985); 47 Fed. Reg. 31,180, 31,202 (1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 40,668, 40,669 (1983); 49 Fed. Reg.
19, 480, 19,482 (1984); 49 Fed. Reg. 29,192, 29,197 (1984); 49 Fed. Reg. 37,066, 37,082 (1984).
33. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 50 Fed. Reg.
47,912 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Revised NCP]. The Agency has stated that the purpose of
the revisions is "to streamline the response mechanisms; to ensure prompt, cost-effective re-
sponse; to respond to issues raised in litigation; and to clarify responsibilities and authorities
contained in the NCP." Id.
34. Id. at 47,969-78 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.61-.71) (Subpart F-Hazardous
Substance Response). Section 105 of CERCLA provides that the revised NCP "shall include a
section of the plan to be known as the national hazardous substance response plan." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605.
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E. National Priorities List
The NCP also contains a "National Priorities List" (NPL) that
identifies the worst hazardous waste sites in the country. 35 EPA has es-
tablished procedures for the listing of sites on the NPL; this "National
Hazard Ranking System" uses a mathematical ranking of sites based on
such factors as the toxicity of the hazardous substances and the extent of
the population exposed.36 The Act itself requires the listing of at least
400 sites with at least one site in each state. 37 As of May 1986, the NPL
contained 835 final and proposed sites. 38 Estimates of the potential
number of hazardous waste sites range into the thousands.39
Although listing of a site on the NPL may have political and practi-
cal effects, the basic legal significance of this listing is to authorize the
government to undertake longterm and potentially expensive permanent
cleanup actions4 ° If a site is not listed on the NPL, the government is
limited to relatively inexpensive short-term cleanup efforts.41
F Development of a Final Cleanup Plan
The ultimate objective of CERCLA is the cleanup of hazardous sub-
stances. The Act contemplates two types of "response actions" to deal
with the release of these substances. Under the Act, short-term efforts are
called "removal" actions and are intended to be relatively rapid re-
35. The National Priorities List is published separately from the National Contingency
Plan. 40 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix B (1985). See CERCLA § 105(8)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(8)(B).
36. See 40 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix A (1985). See also Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 759.F.2d 905, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
37. CERCLA § 105(8)(B).
38. As of this writing, the NPL contains 703 sites, and EPA has proposed the addition of
132 sites. [17 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 85 (May 23, 1986).
39. See [15 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2137, 2138 (Apr. 5, 1985)
(speech by the Director of EPA's Office of Remedial and Emergency Response).
40. These potentially long-term actions are called "remedial actions." See infra notes 45-
47 and accompanying text. The National Contingency Plan expressly provides that "[fund-
financed remedial action, excluding remedial planning activities pursuant to CERCLA section
104(b), may be taken only at sites listed on the NPL." Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,973
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(a)(1)).
Listing a site on the NPL does not mean that remedial action will be taken, only that it
may be taken. Indeed, EPA has stated that the purpose of the list
is primarily to serve as an informational tool for use by EPA in identifying sites that
appear to present a significant risk to public health or the environment. The initial
identification of a site in the NPL is intended primarily to guide EPA in determining
which sites warrant further investigation designed to assess the nature and extent of
the public health and environmental risks associated with the site and to determine
what response action, if any, may be appropriate. Inclusion of a site on the NPL does
not establish that EPA necessarily will undertake response actions.
48 Fed. Reg. 40,658, 40,659 (1983).




sponses to immediate threats to human health and the environment.42
CERCLA provides that a "removal" action may not in most cases cost
more than one million dollars or last more than six months.43 Section
300.65(b) of the revised NCP identifies the factors to be considered in
determining whether a removal action is warranted. These include fac-
tors such as the potential exposure of the local population, potential con-
tamination of drinking water supplies, and the possibility that high levels
of hazardous substances may migrate.44
A long-term cleanup effort is called a "remedial" action and "means
those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions."'45 Remedial actions may include perma-
nent containment of wastes onsite or transportation of the wastes for off-
site disposal. In some cases, it may even include permanent relocation of
residents.46 Government remedial actions for which Superfund money is
42. CERCLA defines "remove" or "removal" as
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such
actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous
substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess,
and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of
removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment,
which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The term includes, in
addition, without being limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit access,
provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of
threatened individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b)
of this title, and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster
Relief Act of 1974.
CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
43. CERCLA § 104(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1). The NCP provides limited circum-
stances in which the one million dollar/six-month limit on removal actions may be exceeded.
Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,971 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.65(a)(3)).
44. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,971 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.65(b)).
45. CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). CERCLA defines "remedy" or "reme-
dial action" as
those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to
removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous sub-
stances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future
public health or welfare or the environment. The term includes but is not limited to
such actions at the location of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protec-
tion using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released
hazardous substances or contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, de-
struction, segregation of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replace-
ment of leaking containers, collection of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or
incineration, provision of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably
required to assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the
environment. The term includes the costs of permanent relocation of residents and
businesses and community facilities [under certain circumstances]. . . . The term
does not include offsite transport of hazardous substances, or the storage, treatment,
destruction, or secure disposition offsite of such hazardous substances or contami-
nated materials [unless the President makes certain findings about cost effectiveness,
the availability of offsite storage capacity and offsite storage is necessary to protect
public health welfare and the environment].
46. Id.
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to be spent ("Fund-financed" actions) may be undertaken only at sites
listed on the NPL.47
The National Contingency Plan provides for a series of steps to de-
termine the appropriate content of removal or remedial plans. When a
release of hazardous substances is first identified, the government under-
takes a preliminary assessment to determine if either a removal or reme-
dial action is warranted. 48 If immediate action is necessary, a removal
action may be undertaken pursuant to section 300.65 of the NCP.49
Where a remedial action appears to be warranted, either the govern-
ment or private parties conduct a "Remedial Investigation/Feasibility
Study" (RI/FS) in which the site is further categorized, cleanup alterna-
tives are identified, and a final plan for cleanup is determined.50 Section
300.68 of the revised NCP specifies factors that should be assessed in
conducting the RI/FS and developing the final cleanup plan.51
There are three basic issues that must be addressed in determining
the content of the final cleanup plan. First, the Act and the NCP require
that Fund-financed remedial actions be selected only after balancing the
need for and cost of cleanup at the site against the availability of
Superfund money for the cleanup of other sites.52 This process is called
"Fund balancing," and it is intended to ensure that the limited resources
of Superfund are used in the most productive manner.
Second, the NCP requires that the "cost effective" alternative be
chosen from among those identified in the feasibility study.5 3 The cost
effectiveness criterion is applied only to those alternatives that satisfy a
minimum standard of protection of human health and welfare and the
environment. Among equally protective alternatives, the cost effective-
ness criterion would require selection of the cheapest. Among incre-
mentally more protective alternatives (all of which satisfy some
minimum standard), the cost effectiveness criterion would involve some
balancing of increased protection with increased cost.54
Third, the final level of cleanup achieved by the remedial plan must
protect human health and welfare and the environment. Determining
47. See supra note 40.
48. See Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,970 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.64(a)).
49. Id. at 47,971 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.65).
50. Id. at 47,973 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(d)). As part of the early assess-
ment, the government will also conduct a site evaluation to determine if the site should be
added to the National Priorities List. Id. at 47,972 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.66).
51. Id. at 47,973-76 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68).
52. CERCLA § 104(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(4); see also Revised NCP, supra note 33,
at 47,975 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(5)(ii)).
53. See CERCLA § 104(c)(4); CERCLA § 105(7), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(7). See also Revised
NCP, supra note 33, at 47,975 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(1)).




this final level is often called the "how clean is clean" issue.5 5 The Act is
silent on the resolution of this issue other than to suggest a basic stan-
dard of protection of health and welfare and the environment.5 6 The
revised NCP attempts to answer this question by specifying when envi-
ronmental standards contained in other statutes must be met at a CER-
CLA site. 57
Although EPA claims that it has no legal obligation to comply with
other federal or state standards when undertaking a CERCLA cleanup,58
the NCP provides that in government-supervised cleanups, a cleanup
plan should ensure in most cases the attainment of: (1) "applicable" re-
quirements of other federal statutes; or (2) "relevant and appropriate"
requirements of other statutes. 59 "Applicable" requirements are "those
55. See generally Comment, Superfund and the National Contingency Plan: How Dirty is
"Dirty"? How Clean is "Clean"?, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1984).
56. The Act does not expressly state what the final level of cleanup should be. However,
the designation of a "hazardous substance" under section 102, the implementation of section
104 actions for pollutants or contaminants, and the exercise of section 106 authority are all
keyed to a determination of a threat to "the public health or welfare or the environment."
In its memorandum on "CERCLA Compliance with Other Environmental Statutes," the
Agency states that in developing remedial and removal actions:
EPA will give primary consideration to the selection of those response actions that
are effective in preventing or, where prevention is not practicable, minimizing the
release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial dan-
ger to present or future public health, welfare or the environment. As a general rule,
this can be accomplished by pursuing remedies that attain or exceed the require-
ments of applicable or relevant and appropriate Federal public health or environmen-
tal laws. However, because of unique circumstances at particular sites, there may be
alternatives that do not meet the standards of other laws, but that still provide pro-
tection of public health and welfare and the environment.
Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,946.
57. EPA developed this guidance in response to a lawsuit brought by environmentalists
and the State of New Jersey. In its preamble to the proposed revisions to the NCP, the Agency
wrote:
some of the revisions reflect agreements reached in settlement of a lawsuit brought by
the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the State of New Jersey (EDF v. U.S.
EPA, No. 82-2234, D.C. Cir. February 1, 1984; State of New Jersey v. U.S. EPA,
No. 82-2238, D.C. Cir., Feb. 1, 1984.) The Agency agreed to the following in the
settlement.
- EPA will propose amendments to the NCP to require that (1) relevant quantitative
health and environmental standards and criteria developed by EPA under other pro-
grams be used in determining the extent of remedy, and (2) if such standard or crite-
ria are substantially adjusted (e.g., for risk level or exposure factors), then the lead
agency must explain the basis for this adjustment.
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan Proposed Rule, 50 Fed.
Reg. 5862 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Proposed NCP Revisions].
58. In the preamble to the Yevisions of Subpart F of the NCP, the Agency wrote:
As explained in the preamble to the proposed NCP revisions (50 FR 5861, February
12, 1985), EPA has determined that the requirements of other Federal environmental
and other public health laws, while not legally applicable to CERCLA response ac-
tions, will generally guide EPA in determining the appropriate extent of cleanup at
CERCLA sites as a matter of policy.
Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,917. See infra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
59. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i) (1985). See also EPA Memorandum, "CERCLA Compliance
with Other Environmental Statutes," Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,946 [hereinafter cited
as CERCLA Compliance Memo].
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Federal requirements that would be legally applicable, whether directly,
or as incorporated by a federally authorized State program, if the re-
sponse actions were not undertaken pursuant to CERCLA section 104 or
106."6 0 "Relevant and appropriate" requirements, in contrast, are
"those requirements that, while not 'applicable,' are designed to apply to
problems sufficiently similar to those encountered at CERCLA sites that
their application is appropriate. ' 61 In a memorandum entitled "CER-
CLA Compliance with Other Environmental Statutes," EPA has pro-
vided examples of such statutes and guidance on their application. 6
2
The NCP provides five exceptions to the requirement that the
cleanup attain "applicable" and "relevant and appropriate" standards.
These standards need not be attained: (1) in interim cleanups; (2) if the
"Fund balancing" analysis indicates that the need to attain the standards
is outweighed by the need to conserve Superfund money; (3) where at-
tainment is technologically impractical; (4) where attainment would re-
sult in other "unacceptable environmental impacts"; and (5) in those
section 106 actions in which "the Fund is unavailable, there is a strong
public interest in expedited cleanup, and the litigation probably would
not result in the desired remedy."' 63 For government-supervised clean-
ups, the NCP provides that compliance with state laws and the proce-
dural requirements (including permitting procedures) of other federal
laws is not necessary. 64
G. Private Claims Against Superfund
Private parties may in some cases be able to recover their cleanup
expenses from Superfund. 65 There are, however, significant limitations
60. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,951 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.6) (defini-
tion of "applicable requirements"). These requirements might, for example, include ground-
water standards applicable to hazardous waste disposal facilities. See id. at 47,922.
61. Id. at 47,954 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.6) (definition of "relevant and appro-
priate requirements"). "Relevant and appropriate" requirements might include drinking
water standards under the Safe Drinking Water Act that normally apply only to water pro-
vided through public drinking water supplies. Id. at 47,922.
62. See CERCLA Compliance Memo, supra note 59.
63. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,975 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(5)).
See CERCLA Compliance Memo, supra note 59, at 47,947.
64. See Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,923 (1985); see also id. at 47,973 (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(a)(3)).
65. See generally Comment, Private Right of Action to Recover Cleanup Costs from
Superfund, 49 ALB. L. REV. 616 (1985).
Section 111 of CERCLA authorizes use of Superfund not only for government response
actions, but also for
the payment of any claim for necessary response costs incurred by any other person
as a result of carrying out the national contingency plan under section 311 of Title 33
and amended by section 105 of this title: Provided, however, That such costs must be
approved under said plan and certified by the responsible Federal official.
CERCLA § 101(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(a)(2) (emphasis in original). The NCP provides a
mechanism called "preauthorization" for those persons seeking to have their actions approved
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on such recovery. Among other requirements, private parties seeking re-
covery from the Fund must first present their claim to responsible par-
ties. If they do not receive compensation from these parties, then they
may either commence an action against such parties or present the claim
to the Fund for payment. 66
For a claim to be compensable from the Fund, the cleanup costs
must have been both incurred as a result of carrying out the National
Contingency Plan and certified by the responsible federal official. 67 The
NCP provides that no private claim against the Fund will be allowed
unless the party obtains EPA approval prior to undertaking the cleanup
action. 68 This "preauthorization" will be granted only if the plan satis-
fies a range of requirements generally applicable to government Fund-
financed cleanups. 69 One basic limitation is that Fund compensation for
a "remedial" action is only authorized if the site is on the NPL.70 Addi-
tionally, to be preauthorized, a plan must satisfy a number of require-
ments, including selection of a proper level of cleanup, selection of a
"cost effective" level of cleanup, assurance that "Fund balancing" has
been performed, and satisfaction of certain other procedural
obligations. 71
II
AVAILABILITY OF A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER
CERCLA
In addition to providing Superfund financing for public and private
cleanups, CERCLA appears to have created a new, direct federal cause
of action authorizing private recovery of cleanup costs from responsible
parties. 72 Section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA provides that potentially re-
sponsible parties shall be liable for "any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency
plan." Courts, faced with a series of private actions seeking recovery
for purposes of claims against Superfund. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,958 (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. § 300.25(d)(1)).
66. CERCLA § 112(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a).
67. CERCLA § 111(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2).
68. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,958 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.'§ 300.25(d)(1)).
69. See id. at 47,958 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.25(d)(2)); id. at 47,971-72 (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68).
70. Id. at 47,958 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.25(d)(2)(iii)).
71. Id. at 47,976 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(1)). In contrast, private parties
who do not seek recovery from the Fund, but seek compensation instead from responsible
parties under section 107(a)(4)(B), are not limited to NPL sites (see hifra notes 93-99 and
accompanying text), need not obtain prior government approval of their plan (see infra notes
100-112 and accompanying text), and need not engage in Fund balancing (see infra note 138).
72. See generally Bickart & Guzy, Wasted Recovery?: Private Cost-Recovery Actions
under Superfund, 8 CHEM. & RADIATION WASTE LITIG. REP. 523 (1984); Note, Private Cost
Recovery Actions Under CERCLA, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1135 (1985); Mauhs, Judicial Linita-
tions on the CERCLA Private Right of Action, 15 ENVTL. L. 471 (1985).
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under this section, have had to resolve the threshold question of whether
CERCLA does indeed establish this new cause of action.
The courts have been nearly unanimous on this issue. Every court
that has engaged in any substantive analysis of the question has con-
cluded that section 107(a)(4)(B) does provide a private cause of action
for recovery of hazardous waste cleanup costs. 73 Although the legislative
history is silent on this specific issue,74 courts have held that the broad
remedial purpose of CERCLA and the plain language of the section
compel a conclusion that a private action is available. 75
At least two arguments have been advanced that section
107(a)(4)(B) does not create a private cause of action. The district court
in Walls v. Waste Resources Corp. concluded that because CERCLA, un-
like most other federal environmental statutes, does not directly provide
for citizen suits, Congress must not have authorized private recovery ac-
tions.76 This conclusion was reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals based on the plain language of section 107(a)(4)(B) and
congressional intent in adopting CERCLA. 77
73. See, eg., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.1985); Artesian
Water Co. v. New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Del. 1985); Homart Dev. Co. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1357 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Cadillac
Fairview/California v. Dow Chem. Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1984);
Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984); Pinole Point Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Wickland Oil Termi-
nals v. ASARCO, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Bulk Distribution Centers v.
Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 515 (D. Mass. 1983); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544
F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982); but cf Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1039 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), aft'd in part, rev'd in part, 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985).
74. As one court noted: "Neither the Senate debate nor the House Reports on earlier
versions of CERCLA ... reveal congressional intent with respect to the private right of ac-
tion under section 9607(a)(4)(B)." Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 n.6 (6th
Cir. 1985).
75. See, e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d at 317; Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F.
Supp. at 1142; Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
76. Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1039. The district court
adopted a Magistrate's Report which stated, in reference to the plaintiffs' claims for recovery
of cleanup costs under section 107 of CERCLA:
There is no citizen's suit provision under CERCLA. Apparently such actions are to
be brought pursuant to other citizen suit provisions such as those found in the
FWPCA and the RCRA. The undersigned is of the opinion that Congress did not
intend to create a private right of action under CERCLA.
Id. at 1042.
77. 761 F.2d 311. The court noted:
Although the legislative history of CERCLA is vague, reflecting the compromise
nature of the legislation eventually enacted, it is clear that the statute was designed
primarily to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites by placing the
ultimate financial responsibility for cleanup on those responsible for the hazardous
wastes. . . . Allowing a private action to recover response costs from responsible
parties under section 9607(a)(4)(B) is thus consistent with both the language of sec-
tion 9607(a)(4)(B) and with the congressional purpose underlying CERCLA as a
whole.
Id. at 318 (footnote and citation omitted).
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Additionally, some defendants have asserted a more complex argu-
ment that section 107(a)(4)(B) does not in itself state a cause of action.78
Defendants have noted that under sections 111 and 112 of CERCLA,
Fund money will not be paid unless the claim is first presented to a party
who "may be liable under 107." If the responsible party does not pay, an
action may be brought against that person or against the Fund. Section
107, it has been argued, merely defines the group of responsible parties
for purposes of claims against Superfund under 111 and 112.79 Under
this argument, responsible parties would be liable only for costs which
are otherwise recoverable from Superfund, and, as discussed above, there
are numerous prerequisites for recovery from the Fund that are not con-
tained in section 107 itself.80 Although this is a clever argument, courts
have rejected it as to recovery of both government 8' and private party82
cleanup expenses. As one court stated, "section 107 and sections 111 and
112 provide causes of action that are distinct and independent. ' 83
In concluding that section 107(a)(4)(B) establishes a direct cause of
action, courts have relied on several factors. First, courts have focused
on the plain language of section 107(a)(4)(B), which specifically provides
that parties are liable. 84 Second, courts have noted that section 107(a)
states that liability under the section exists "notwithstanding any other
provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in
subsection (b) of this section. '85 Third, courts have concluded that a
private right of action is consistent with Congress' objective of assuring
the rapid cleanup of hazardous waste sites.86 Finally, courts have been
78. See, e.g., Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 288; United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1117 (1982).
79. See, e.g., Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 288.
80. For example, section 111 contains an explicit provision that costs cannot be recovered
from the Fund unless they have been previously approved by the federal government. CER-
CLA § Il1(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 961 1(a)(3); see CERCLA § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 9612. See supra
notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100.
82. See, e.g., Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425; Pinole Point Properties, 596 F.
Supp. 283; Artesian Water Co., 605 F. Supp. 1348.
83. Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 288.
84. See, e.g., id. ("The language of section 107(a)(4)(B) is extremely broad and inclu-
sive. . . . It is difficult for the court to imagine statutory language that would more clearly
grant a private cause of action"); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. at 1428.
85. See, e.g., Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. at 1118; Pinole Point Properties, 596
F. Supp. at 288.
86. In Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. at 1142-43, the court wrote:
it is clear from the discussions which preceded the passage of CERCLA that the
statute is designed to achieve one key objective - to facilitate the prompt clean up of
hazardous dumpsites by providing a means of financing both governmental and pri-
vate responses and by placing the ultimate financial burden upon those responsible
for the danger. The liability provision is an integral part of the statute's method of
achieving this goal for it gives a private party the right to recover its response costs
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concerned about the consequences, such as the need for federal approval
of response costs, if section 107 were construed simply to define liability
for purposes of Fund recovery.87
The virtually unanimous conclusion of the courts, that CERCLA
does create a new private cause of action, is consistent with both the
language of the Act and congressional intent to promote, through a
broad array of mechanisms, the rapid cleanup of hazardous wastes in the
United States. There is little doubt that this private cause of action now
exists under CERCLA.
III
CONDITIONS FOR ASSERTION OF A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER
SECTION 107(a)(4)(B)
Although courts have concluded that section 107 provides a direct
cause of action independent of other provisions of CERCLA, section
107(a) itself establishes some prerequisites to recovery of response costs
from responsible parties. Some of these prerequisites are common to all
liability under section 107(a). Responsible parties are only liable for gov-
ernment or private cleanup costs if there has been a "release or
threatened release" 88 of a "hazardous substance" 89 from a "facility." 90
In addition, section 107(a)(4)(B) imposes extra requirements for pri-
vate parties seeking to recover response costs. Such costs must be: (1)
"consistent with the national contingency plan"; (2) "necessary"; and (3)
"incurred by any other party." It is these latter requirements, specific to
the cause of action under section 107(a)(4)(B), that have raised the most
difficult questions involving the private cause of action.
A. Consistency with the National Contingency Plan
CERCLA provides that private parties can only recover costs in-
curred "consistent with the National Contingency Plan." Thus EPA,
through promulgation of the NCP, has the authority to define the basic
87. See, e.g., Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 290.
88. CERCLA defines "release" to include "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emit-
ting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the envi-
ronment." CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). See also New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985); Missouri v. Independent Petrochem. Corp., 610 F.
Supp. 4, 4-5 (E.D. Mo. 1985). See generally W. FRANK & T. ATKESON, supra note 8, at 37.
89. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
90. "Facility" is broadly defined in CERCLA to include
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline ... well, pit,
pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling
stock or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been depos-
ited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not
include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). See New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp.
291, 295-97 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
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requirements for private party cleanups.91 These requirements have been
unclear, however, because early versions of the NCP were ambiguous
about what private parties were required to do, and courts had split on a
number of issues relating to the consistency requirement. The Agency's
revised NCP now explicitly defines the requirements applicable to private
parties seeking recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B). 92 These new regula-
tions should resolve most of the basic issues associated with the private
cause of action under section 107(a)(4)(B). They do, however, raise new
concerns.
1. Listing on the National Priorities List
A basic issue under section 107(a)(4)(B) was whether private parties
could recover expenses for cleanup of sites not listed on the National
Priorities List. Because the NCP provided that the government could
undertake "remedial actions" only at NPL sites, defendants had argued
that private party expenses at non-NPL sites could not be consistent with
the NCP.93 Although earlier versions of the NCP were not explicit, vir-
tually every court that addressed this issue concluded that listing of the
cleanup site on the NPL was not necessary for recovery of expenses
under section 107(a)(4)(B). 94 In the revised NCP, the Agency appears to
have resolved this issue; there is no requirement that a site be on the
NPL for a party to undertake a cleanup consistent with the NCP.95
There would be little justification for making the listing of a site on
the NPL a prerequisite for private party cost recovery. Under the NCP,
91. Some commentators on the proposed revisions questioned EPA's authority to define
private party requirements. The Agency responded that "because section 107 of CERCLA
authorizes private cost recovery only for actions that are 'consistent with' the NCF [sic] EPA
has an obligation, as promulgator of the NCP, to explain how private actions may be so consis-
tent." Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,934.
92. Id. at 47,977 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)).
93. See, e.g., Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 287-88; Bulk Distribution Centers,
589 F. Supp. at 1444; Cadillac Fairview/California, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1114.
94. See, e.g., Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1046; Homart Dev. Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) at 1367; Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 289-90. But see Cadillac
Fairview/California, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1115, in which the court wrote: "The fact
that the EPA refuses to list the site on the [National Priorities] List for further inquiry shows
that cleanup activity on the site is not consistent with the [National Contingency] Plan." In a
motion for reconsideration, however, the court stated: "This Court's order has been mis-
characterized by the plaintiff and at least one other court, Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v.
Monsanto Co ... as requiring the site to appear on the National Priorities List." Cadillac
Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1584, 1585 n.1 (C.D.
Cal. 1984).
95. In the requirements for private parties under section 300.71, no limitation to NPL
sites is mentioned. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,977 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.71). Under section 300.68, only Fund-financed actions are limited to NPL sites. See
supra note 40. The agency should have been a little more explicit. At least one commentator
has found the proposal ambiguous on this issue. See Orloff, Private Enforcement of Superfund,
3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 29 (1985).
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listing a site on the NPL is used to authorize the expenditure of
Superfund money on remedial actions; this restriction ensures that lim-
ited funds will be used for the cleanup of the worst hazardous waste
sites.96 Other actions can be taken at non-NPL sites where Superfund
money is not expended. In the case of short-term removal actions, for
example, where in most cases there is a statutory limit on expenditures,
Fund money can be spent on sites not on the NPL.97 Further, in cases
where the government issues a section 106 order, which does not require
expenditures from Superfund, the restriction to NPL sites does not
apply.98
A limitation under section 107(a)(4)(B) to recovery of expenses at
NPL sites would make sense only if it served to conserve Superfund
money. This logic simply does not apply to private parties seeking recov-
ery, not from the Fund, but directly from responsible parties.99 EPA's
decision to reject any requirement limiting 107(a)(4)(B) cost recoveries to
the cleanup of NPL sites is thus perfectly consistent with other provi-
sions of CERCLA.
2. Prior Government Approval
Perhaps the single most difficult issue under section 107(a)(4)(B) is
the role that the government should play in approval of private cleanup
plans. Early versions of the NCP were somewhat ambiguous, and courts
had split over the need for government approval. 1°° In the revised Na-
tional Contingency Plan, EPA has stated that prior government approval
96. In the proposed revisions to the NPL, the Agency noted:
CERCLA does not require that a site be on the NPL to be eligible for Fund-financed
remedial responses. That restriction is one EPA voluntarily imposed in the existing
NCP, for reasons of Fund management and to alert the public to the significance of a
site being included among the priority releases.
Proposed NCP Revisions, supra note 57, at 5869. See also Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp.
at 290.
97. Compare Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,971-72 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.65(b)(1)) (requirements for removal action do not include listing on the NPL) with id. at
47,973 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(a)(1)) (requirements for remedial action, including
limitation to sites on the NPL).
98. See Section 106 Memo, supra note 16. Cf Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,976 (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(I)) (requirements for response actions pursuant to a section
106 order).
99. As one court noted: "The priority list serves to allocate scarce government resources,
a purpose not served by curtailing the remedial actions undertaken by private persons who
later seek to recover from those responsible for the release of the hazardous waste disposal."
Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 290.
100. Some courts had construed the NCP as requiring government approval. See, e.g.,
Artesian Water Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1361; Wickland Oil Terminals, 590 F. Supp. at 78 (re-
quires government supervision); Cadillac Fairview/California, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at
1114 (site must be on NPL to commence suit); Bulk Distribution Centers, 589 F. Supp. at
1446-47..
Other courts had concluded that such prior approval was not necessary. See, e.g., Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1048; Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531, 1534-35
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of private party cleanup expenses is not a prerequisite to private party
recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B).0l1
This is an issue of tremendous significance. If prior approval were
to be required, the speed and number of private party cleanups could be
diminished. However, without prior approval, the specter is raised that
private parties will inadequately remedy a situation and perhaps even
make it worse.
There is little statutory basis for arguing that Congress intended
government approval to be a prerequisite to a section 107(a)(4)(B) action.
Although recovery from Superfund is expressly conditioned on prior ap-
proval, no such requirement is contained in section 107(a)(4)(B) for re-
covery from responsible parties. 0 2 Some courts have suggested that the
provision of section 107(a)(4)(B) that limits private recovery to "other"
expenses implies that there must first have been some expenditure of gov-
ernment funds under section 107(a)(4)(A).10 3 Most courts, however,
have not found a specific statutory requirement of prior government ac-
tion or authorization. 10 4
In the revised NCP, EPA has rejected the requirement of prior gov-
ernment approval for private cleanup actions under section 107(a)(4)(B).
The NCP now provides that prior government approval of private
cleanup efforts is required only if the government has issued a section 106
order compelling cleanup or if the private party intends to seek reim-
bursement of expenses from Superfund.10 5  Although these revisions
should resolve the question whether governmental approval is necessary
for consistency with the NCP, the question remains whether it is a good
idea to encourage private party cleanup without such approval.
Prior government approval is a mechanism that would help safe-
guard the public from improper or inadequate private cleanups. In the
(M.D. Pa. 1985); Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 289-90; Homart Dev. Co., 22 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1367-68.
101. In the preamble to the revised NCP, the Agency noted:
Section 300.71 requires the lead agency to approve in advance the adequacy of a
response by a responsible party or other person when an action is undertaken in
compliance with an administrative order or consent decree under CERCLA section
106 or when reimbursement from the Fund is to be sought under section 112 of
CERCLA. . . . Otherwise, government approval of response actions is not
required.
Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,934.
102. Compare section 11l(a)(2) of CERCLA (payment from the Fund of necessary re-
sponse costs by any other person is authorized "Provided, however, That such costs must be
approved under said plan and certified by the responsible Federal official"); with section 107
(responsible parties are liable for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the National Contingency Plan."). 42 U.S.C. §§ 961 1(a)(2), 9607.
103. See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals, 590 F. Supp. at 77; Bulk Distribution Centers, 589
F. Supp. at 1447.
104. See, e.g., Artesian Water Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1357; Pinole Point Properties, 596 F.
Supp. at 290; Homart Dev. Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1367.
105. See supra note 101.
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absence of government approval, it is the private party that decides the
content of a response plan. As one judge noted: "I believe that the pub-
lic is generally better protected by a system in which the government
bears the ultimate responsibility for balancing competing interests to ar-
rive at environmentally sound and cost-effective remedial actions." 10 6
This policy concern influenced the courts that construed the old NCP as
requiring prior government approval of private response plans.10 7
In the preamble to the NCP, the Agency responded to this issue:
The costs and delays of prior approval by EPA of private party responses
could significantly reduce the number and scope of those responses ....
EPA believes that the requirement that private party responses comply
with all applicable Federal, State and local requirements, including per-
mit requirements, as appropriate, is sufficient to deter poorly planned
cleanup proposals and minimize the possibility of independent private
party and government responses.) °
Thus, the Agency is relying on private party compliance with the NCP to
assure protection of the public and the environment.
Additional supervision of private cleanup efforts may be appropri-
ate. 109 EPA is placing considerable weight on the requirement that pri-
vate parties comply with applicable or appropriate and relevant
environmental statutes when developing response plans. As discussed
below, interpretation of this requirement is far from straightforward and
entails the exercise of a considerable amount of judgment and environ-
mental expertise. Furthermore, a site may have environmental problems
that existing statutes do not address.110 Decisionmaking is being placed
in the hands of private parties who have a great incentive to minimize
cleanup costs. Subsequent evaluation by judges who lack specific envi-
ronmental expertise may not provide adequate supervision.
The government, of course, does not have the resources to review
106. Artesian Water Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1361. See also Bulk Distribution Centers, where
the court stated:
In this court's view, the only practical way to safeguard the public's interest, while
fairly mediating the competing concerns of the parties potentially responsible for
cleaning up the release, is for the government to approve the clean-up proposal
before it is implemented by the private parties. The government certainly is in a
better position than are private parties to pass judgment on the efficacy of a clean-up
proposal. To begin with, state or federal environmental agencies possess scientific and
technological sophistication, along with an appreciation of the problems arising from
hypertechnical environmental standards. Additionally, the clean-up proposal must
comply with laws that the state or federal governments enforce, so it follows that
their approval of a plan would be desirable to reduce a party's exposure to liability.
589 F. Supp. at 1446.
107. See supra note 106.
108. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,934.
109. The government does, of course, retain the power to control the cleanup process.
Under the NCP, prior approval is necessary when section 106 orders have been issued. See id.
at 47,934. By exercising its section 106 authority, the government can assure proper cleanup
at hazardous waste sites.
110. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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cleanup plans for every site where hazardous substances are being re-
moved. Some mechanism is needed to separate those cleanups that
should be subject to government supervision from those that need not be.
Perhaps the answer lies in the NPL. For the worst sites, those creating
the greatest threat to public health and the environment, prior approval
of any cleanup efforts should be mandatory. For non-NPL sites, where
there is less concern and little likelihood of direct government action,
subsequent court assessment of the cleanup may be an adequate safe-
guard. Currently, however, parties may undertake cleanup at NPL and
non-NPL sites without prior government approval, if the government has
not yet issued a section 106 order or if Fund reimbursement is not
sought.
EPA should consider revising both its criteria for listing sites on the
NPL and the requirements for government approval of private cleanups.
A revised ranking system could be developed creating a "second tier" of
sites not serious enough to warrant immediate government cleanup but
significant enough to warrant government supervision of private clean-
ups. The NCP should be revised to provide that, for purposes of consis-
tency with the NCP, prior government approval is necessary for private
party cleanups at these sites. EPA has such authority pursuant to its
responsibility to develop the NCP. 111
Requiring government approval of cleanups at these "second tier"
sites would allow government supervision of cleanup where necessary,
but without obligating the government to institute the cleanup effort it-
self or review every cleanup action taken by a private party.1 12 This
would focus government efforts on those sites that require more complex
cleanup decisions. Simpler sites, not on the "second tier" list, would pre-
sumably involve easier cleanups with less need to consider the discretion-
ary application of vague cleanup standards. Further, government
approval, as discussed infra Section IV, would extend the protection for
damage claims contained in section 107(d) of CERCLA, and thus further
encourage private cleanups." 3 Finally, increased government supervi-
sion and an expansion of the NPL would provide the public with addi-
tional information and promote public confidence in private hazardous
waste cleanups. Considerable benefits would accrue if the government
111. As the court noted in Artesian Water Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1357: "[The] provisions of
Section 105 provide ample authority for EPA to include in its revisions of the NCP a require-
ment that governmental approval of response actions be a prerequisite to recovery of the costs
thereof from responsible parties."
112. This proposal would have some interesting consequences. I must confess I would love
to see a responsible party petitioning EPA to get a site on the NPL in order to prevent the
property owner from suing him after cleaning up the site. I would also like to see the govern-
ment explain to the neighbors that the government has listed the site, not to clean it up, but to
inhibit private cleanup of the site.
113. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
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extended its supervisory function on a selective basis through revision of
the NPL.
3. Notice to Responsible Parties
CERCLA requires that, before it can remedy a site through a sec-
tion 104 cleanup action, the government must determine whether respon-
sible parties will properly undertake a response action. 114 EPA's policy
is to notify PRP's and request that they undertake cleanup before the
government itself commences a cleanup action. 1" 5 Similarly, the Act re-
quires that private parties seeking compensation from Superfund first
present their claims to the responsible parties.116 The logic of this re-
quirement is obvious. Limited Superfund money should not be spent if a
private party will undertake the cleanup itself.
Although at least one court has suggested that the precleanup "noti-
fication" requirement is applicable to private party cleanups as well," 7
EPA, in the revised NCP, has stated that notification of responsible par-
ties prior to cleanup is not a prerequisite for compensation under section
114. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
115. See 47 Fed. Reg. 20,663, 20,666 (1982).
116. CERCLA § 112(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a).
117. See Bulk Distribution Centers, 589 F. Supp. at 1448-50. Other courts have indicated
that private parties must notify responsible parties of their intention to file suit under section
107(a)(4)(B) at least 60 days prior to filing such a suit. See United States v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1205, 1207-08 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
Farms Dairy, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 515, 517 (D. Mass. 1983). Such a procedural requirement,
although itself questionable, would be a relatively minor aspect of the process.
Although the court in Bulk Distribution Centers, supra, indicated that notification prior to
cleanup is compelled by CERCLA, the court's analysis seems flawed. The court found this
requirement by interpreting sections 101(4), 107, and 112. Section 112, the court noted, re-
quires presentation of a claim to a responsible party before reimbursement from Superfund can
be sought. Section 101(4) defines "claim" as a demand in writing for a sum certain. Thus, the
court concluded: "Reading these sections together with 9607(a)(4)(B), it appears that before a
private claimant can commence a cost recovery action against other private parties, it must
first serve a letter demanding a 'sum certain' to cover the costs of the clean-up operation." Id.
at 1448. Apparently this letter would not merely be a formality after the cleanup is completed.
The court stated that the purpose of the demand letter is to allow the responsible party to
determine "whether it is financially practicable to participate in the clean-up effort." Id. at
1449. A basic element of the court's reasoning was its conclusion that the private plan must
first have been approved by the government. With such approval, the letter could reasonably
state what the subsequent cleanup would entail. The court also relied on the Agency's proce-
dures for its notification of responsible parties prior to cleanup.
A few of the errors in this analysis include: (1) reading the requirement under section 112
that a claim be presented to a responsible party prior to recovery from the Fund as a require-
ment that the claim be presented prior to cleanup; (2) linking the cause of action under section
107 with that under section 112; and (3) relying on the procedures for government notification
of private parties prior to cleanup, because section 104(al expressly imposes this requirement
on the government prior to undertaking a section 104 cleanup. To the extent that the court
acknowledges that the purpose of prior notification would be defeated without a requirement
of prior government approval, its conclusion is also suspect. Most courts and the EPA reject
any such requirement.
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107(a)(4)(B). The preamble to the NCP states that "EPA has not re-
quired that private parties try and locate responsible parties and en-
courage them to undertake the response." 11 8 The Agency rather
cryptically adds, however, that notification of responsible parties "will be
helpful if the private party contemplates attempting to recover response
costs from the responsible party." 119
EPA has chosen the proper course in rejecting notification as an
absolute prerequisite for compensation. The government notice require-
ment helps ensure that Superfund money is not spent unnecessarily; be-
cause private party cleanups are not drawing upon Superfund money,
prior notice does not further any Fund conservation objective.
Notwithstanding EPA's position that notification is not an absolute
prerequisite for compensation under section 107(a)(4)(B), private parties
should attempt to notify PRP's at the time the cleanup plan is developed.
First, the NCP does require "public participation," including in many
cases public hearings and a public comment period, during plan develop-
ment.120 PRP's, if known, may be among the group that must be notified
as part of the public participation requirement. Thus, the Agency has in
fact required notification of PRP's in many cases. Second, even if notifi-
cation were not accomplished though the public participation process, a
private party who contemplated recouping expenses under section
107(a)(4)(B) would be well-advised to involve the PRP's in development
of the cleanup plan. Section 107(a)(4)(B) requires that a party seeking to
recover the costs of cleanup demonstrate that the cleanup was executed
in a manner consistent with the NCP. As discussed below, a private
party will undoubtedly be in a better position to establish consistency,
especially in demonstrating that the cleanup was cost-effective, if the
PRP has had an opportunity to comment on the plan.12' Perhaps this is
why EPA believes that PRP notification will be "helpful."
4. Development of an Appropriate Cleanup Plan
The ultimate purpose of the NCP is to aid in developing a cleanup
plan that will assure protection of human health and welfare and the
environment. To accomplish this purpose, the NCP contains provisions
detailing how the government is to prepare appropriate removal and re-
medial plans.122 Additionally, section 300.71 of the NCP now contains
requirements for private parties seeking recovery of their cleanup ex-
118. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,935.
119. Id.
120. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 42-64 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the NCP identifies those
factors that must be considered by parties developing a response plan pursuant to a section 106
order or private parties seeking to recover their expenses from Superfund. Revised NCP, supra
note 33, at 47,958 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.25(d)).
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penses pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B). 123 To be "consistent with the
NCP," response plans developed by private parties must comply with
these new requirements.
The NCP mandates neither a specific form nor level of site cleanup.
Given the number of hazardous substances and the variety of site condi-
tions, such specificity would be impossible. Rather, the NCP provisions
establish a process for decisionmaking and a series of factors and stan-
dards that must be considered in arriving at a final cleanup plan. Section
300.71 provides that for "removal" actions, private parties must act in
circumstances warranting a removal action and implement removal
"consistent with" the requirements governing federal cleanup actions.1 24
For the more significant long-term "remedial" actions, the regulations
require that a private party: (1) undertake proper site analysis and inves-
tigation; (2) identify environmentally acceptable cleanup alternatives that
meet or exceed "applicable or appropriate and relevant" federal stan-
dards and comply with state substantive requirements; (3) select the cost-
effective response from among these alternatives; and (4) provide an op-
portunity for public comment on the plan.125
The requirements for development of environmentally acceptable
cleanup alternatives and selection of the cost-effective response are the
core of this process. The approach adopted by EPA, however, raises
troubling questions as to whether private parties will have adequate gui-
dance and be assured that their cleanup plans will in fact be "consistent
with" the NCP. Even more troubling is whether these requirements will
ensure that private cleanup plans, unchecked by any requirement for
prior government approval, will promote CERCLA's objectives of pro-
tecting human health and the environment.
a. Identflcation of Environmentally Acceptable Alternatives
One of the most difficult questions under CERCLA is determining
the final level of cleanup that should be achieved at a hazardous waste
site-the so-called "how clean is clean" issue.1 26 With respect to govern-
ment cleanups, the NCP addresses this issue by requiring that the gov-
ernment cleanup plan be chosen from among alternatives that meet or
exceed "applicable" or "appropriate and relevant" requirements of other
environmental statutes, unless one of five exemptions applies. 127 The
provisions of section 300.71 that deal with development of private
cleanup plans basically incorporate the provisions applicable to the fed-
123. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,977 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(2)).
124. Id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(2)(i)).
125. Id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(2)(ii)).
126. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
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eral government. 128 The requirements for private parties, however, con-
tain provisions which differ in significant aspects from the federal
requirements. These provisions rely in large part on the unsupervised
judgment of private parties to implement vague guidance on the proper
standards to apply. The unarticulated consequence of this approach may
be federal reliance on substantive state requirements to assure that pri-
vate cleanups are environmentally acceptable.
i. Applicability of Federal Environmental Standards
EPA, as discussed above, claims that environmental standards from
other statutes are not legally applicable to government-approved cleanup
actions under CERCLA, but that the government, as a matter of policy,
will assure attainment of all "applicable or relevant and appropriate" re-
quirements unless one of a number of exceptions applies. 129 The revised
NCP takes a different position on this issue in relation to private party
cleanup efforts. The NCP provides that for purposes of section
107(a)(4)(B) recovery, private parties "shall comply with all otherwise
legally applicable or relevant and appropriate Federal, State, and local
requirements, including permit requirements." 130
Notwithstanding the straightforward language, this provision con-
tains a number of significant ambiguities. First, the provision seems to
make compliance with non-applicable but "relevant and appropriate" en-
vironmental standards an absolute requirement for private parties who
wish to recover their cleanup costs under section 107(a)(4)(B). Thus,
EPA is imposing specific substantive requirements in situations where
Congress has either explicitly or implicitly declined to apply them.1 31
Presumably, the Agency has the authority to impose such a requirement
under its CERCLA authority. 132
Assuming EPA has the authority under CERCLA to require com-
pliance with the standards of other environmental statutes, the problem
remains of how to identify those requirements. EPA's guidance on ap-
128. 40 C.F.R. section 300.71(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1985) requires that private parties comply with
the provisions of section 300.68(e) through (i), which specify the requirements for development
of a cleanup plan by the government.
129. Id.
130. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,977 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(4)).
131. Indeed, the regulations also require that cleanups "attain" or "exceed" applicable
requirements where necessary to protect public health and the environment. See id. at 47,975
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(1)). See also id. at 47,919. Of course, the Agency is not
mandating compliance with non-applicable environmental requirements. It is merely stating
that compliance is necessary if the party wishes to assert a cost-recovery action under section
107.
132. The Agency does have authority under section 105 to specify contents of the NCP
that will insure that public health, welfare, and the environment are protected. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605. For EPA's assertion of its authority to promulgate regulations dealing with private
party cleanups under 107, see supra note 91.
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plying these "non-applicable" requirements acknowledges the site-spe-
cific nature of the problem. The NCP preamble notes: "Although
applicability is determined objectively, the determination of what re-
quirements are relevant and appropriate is more flexible. This determi-
nation may require the exercise of the lead agency's best professional
judgment."' 133 Under the NCP, this judgment must be made by private
parties who hope later to claim consistency with the NCP. As will be
discussed below, a private party may not be able to assure that it has
made the correct decision until after the cleanup money is spent.134
The NCP is also unclear about whether the exemptions to compli-
ance with other environmental standards that apply to government
cleanups also apply to private party cleanups. The NCP requires that
private party remedial plans include an assessment of factors specified in
section 300.68(e)-(i). 135 This includes the requirement that a final
cleanup plan meet or exceed "applicable" or "appropriate and relevant"
standards.136 Section 300.68(i), however, contains the five exemptions to
compliance with applicable environmental requirements.1 37 Thus, the
question arises whether private parties can take advantage of these ex-
emptions when developing a remedial plan consistent with the NCP. For
two exemptions the answer is clear. The "Fund balancing" exemption is
not applicable to a section 107(a)(4)(B) cleanup. 138 Further, the exemp-
tion that applies where "there is a strong public interest in expedited
cleanup" is by its own terms applicable only to cleanups taken pursuant
to a section 106 order.1 39
The status of the remaining exemptions is somewhat uncertain.
Although the NCP expressly requires that private parties comply with
other environmental requirements, the NCP also seems to provide an
exemption for interim cleanup measures, where final compliance is tech-
nologically infeasible, or where there would be other unacceptable envi-
ronmental impacts. Such exemptions may make sense and may be
appropriate. The NCP is simply unclear, however, as to what the gov-
ernment intended on this issue. Because the Agency disclaims any au-
thority to waive the requirements of other environmental statutes for
133. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,919.
134. See infra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
135. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,977 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.71(a)(2)(ii)(B)).
136. Id. at 47,974 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(e)(i)).
137. Id. at 47,975 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)).
138. Fund balancing is only applicable for actions in which Superfund money is sought.
The preamble to the revised NCP expressly states: "Responses pursuant to section 106 of
CERCLA and other private responses are not subject to the Fund balancing requirements of
300.68(1)." Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,935. Because a private cost recovery action
under section 107(a)(4)(B) will not involve a claim on the Fund, a "Fund balancing" consider-
ation would be inappropriate.
139. Id. at 47,975 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(5)(v)).
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private parties, 140 it probably really intended "applicable" statutes to ap-
ply regardless of whether these requirements are "technologically infeasi-
ble" or would produce "unacceptable environmental impacts" or are part
of interim actions that are regulated under other laws. For "relevant and
appropriate requirements" the answer is much less clear.
ii. Level of Cleanup in the Absence of Federal Standards
The NCP largely relies on other federal environmental standards to
define the level of cleanup that should be attained at a site. Where other
standards do not exist, the NCP requires the exercise of considerable
judgment. In such cases, the private party must "select that cost-effec-
tive alternative that effectively mitigates and minimizes threats to and
provides adequate protection of public health and welfare and the envi-
ronment, considering cost, technology, and the reliability of the rem-
edy." 141 In the preamble, the agency indicates that this requirement is
implemented through a "risk assessment." 142
iii. Applicability of Federal Procedural and State Substantive
Standards
Although EPA claims that neither state nor federal requirements
legally apply to federally approved CERCLA cleanups, the NCP specifi-
cally provides that both federal procedural and state substantive require-
ments apply to private cleanup actions other than those taken pursuant
to section 106 order or "Fund-financed" response action.143 Thus, pri-
vate parties seeking recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B) must comply
with all state environmental laws governing the cleanup and obtain all
federal and state permits in order to assure that their action is "consistent
with the NCP."
The Agency has expressly denied that it has authority to exempt
private parties from these requirements. The preamble to the revised
NCP states: "EPA cannot exempt privately financed cleanups not taken
pursuant to CERCLA 106 from permitting requirements. EPA does not
believe that private responses, unlike section 104 and 106 responses, are
exempt from compliance with State (or other Federal) laws.'"44 The
Agency also claims that application of state law to private cleanups is
warranted because states do not participate in private cleanup plan devel-
140. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
141. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,975 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(3)).
This provision expressly applies to the "lead agency," but under section 300.71(a)(3), all ac-
tions to be taken by the lead agency may be taken by the private party carrying out the
response.
142. Id. at 47,920. Chapter 5 of EPA's "Guidance on Feasibility Studies under CER-
CLA" (Apr. 1985) describes EPA's approach to risk assessment. See id.
143. Id. at 47,977 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(4)).
144. Id. at 47,924.
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opment as they do with plans that are federally supervised under sections
104 and 106.145
Given the difficulties in identifying "appropriate and relevant" fed-
eral standards, and the uncertainty in undertaking "risk assessments" to
establish cleanup plans in the absence of federal standards, substantive
state environmental laws may be the most direct and certain control over
private hazardous waste cleanups. The NCP may, in effect, delegate to
states the responsibility to ensure the adequacy of private cleanups. Dele-
gation of authority to states is a common element of general environmen-
tal statutes. 146 Unlike other federal environmental statutes, however, the
NCP provisions are not accompanied by any requirement that states
adopt some minimum level of environmental standards.
Although the states play an important role in hazardous waste
cleanups, Congress adopted CERCLA in response to the perceived inad-
equacy of state control over hazardous waste. State laws dealing with
hazardous waste cleanup vary widely in their stringency. Relying upon
state laws to define the requirements for cleanups under CERCLA means
that cleanup levels will be determined not by environmental conditions
existing at the site, but by the happenstance of the state in which the
cleanup is undertaken. This seems inconsistent with congressional intent
in adopting CERCLA.
b. Cost Effectiveness
Section 104(c)(4) requires that the government select a "cost effec-
tive response" when undertaking a remedial action.147 The NCP also
provides that for purposes of a cost recovery action under section
107(a)(4)(B), a response action will be consistent with the NCP if a pri-
vate party selects the "cost effective response."' 48 Under EPA's inter-
pretation of this requirement, cost effectiveness is used only to select
from among a group of alternatives that all satisfy some minimum level
145. Id. Whatever the merits of this position, there is one somewhat confusing element of
the Agency's rule. The revised NCP provides that actions which are "Fund financed" are not
subject to these federal and state requirements. Private parties may, subject to prior approval
of their plan by the government, recover their cleanup expenses from Superfund. Are these
private party cleanups for which future Fund recovery is to be sought exempt from state law or
is the exemption limited to section 104 cleanups undertaken by the federal government itself?
If the former is the case, then federal approval acts as a waiver of state law. Perhaps this
makes sense; such approval at least helps assure that the cleanup is consistent with the require-
ments of the NCP. In the absence of such approval, only the intention to recover costs under
section 107(a)(4)(B) acts as an incentive to assure that cleanup is consistent with the NCP.
146. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1982) (requirements for state assumption of NPDES
permitting authority under the Clean Water Act), 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (Supp. I 1984) (provisions
for state assumption of hazardous waste facility permitting authority under the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(4).
148. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,977 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.71(a)(2)(ii)(C)).
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of environmental protection. 149
In the preamble to the proposed NCP, although not in the final revi-
sion, the Agency indicated that selection of a "cost effective remedy" was
not an absolute prerequisite to cost recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B).
Rather, the preamble to the proposal states that recovery will be limited
to the cost of the cost effective remedy.150 The language of the final NCP
is identical to the proposal on this issue, and there is no indication in the
revised NCP that the Agency intended a change from the proposal.
Thus, one can assume that the Agency has adopted this position in the
final NCP as well.
If it is the Agency's view that recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B) is
limited to the "cost effective" response, interesting litigation will result.
Under the Agency's position, there will inevitably be after-the-fact dis-
putes, not about what the cleanup actually cost, but rather about what
the cost-effective method would have been. Indeed, the actual cleanup
selected may be largely irrelevant, and parties will be disputing what the
proper cost-effective alternative should have been.
The plaintiff in a cost-recovery action has the burden of proving that
its response was consistent with the NCP. 151 The plaintiff will presuma-
bly have the initial burden of showing that it complied with applicable
149. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. In the preamble to the revised NCP,
the Agency notes: "The approach embodied in today's rule is to select a cost-effective alterna-
tive from a range of remedies that protect the public health and welfare and the environment."
Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,921.
Notably, the cost effectiveness requirement involves the actual selection of a method of
cleanup; it does not merely preclude spending an excessive amount on the selected cleanup.
Presumably, the statutory requirement that limits recovery to "necessary" costs of response
would prevent recovery of an amount in excess of what the selected cleanup should have cost if
done properly.
The cost effectiveness requirement also differs significantly from the "Fund balancing"
requirement, which does not apply to section 107(a)(4)(B) actions (see supra note 138), and is
designed to ensure that the limited amount of Superfund money is allocated reasonably.
150. The preamble to the proposal states: "The private party may choose a more costly
response, but the responsible party is only responsible for the costs of the 'cost effective' rem-
edy." Proposed NCP Revisions, supra note 57, at 5870.
151. In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984), the court in dictum indicated that the plaintiff in a private cost recovery
action under section 107(a)(4)(B) had the burden of proving consistency with the NCP. Id. at
850. The case involved a cost recovery action by the government under section 107(a)(4)(A),
and the court specifically held that in this type of action the defendant had the burden of proof
on the consistency issue. Id. The court based this conclusion on the language of section
107(a)(4)(A), which authorizes compensation for government costs which are "not inconsis-
tent with the NCP." Id. The court stated that it read "the insertion of the word 'not' immedi-
ately prior to 'inconsistent' to mean that the defendants are presumed liable for all response
costs incurred unless they can overcome this presumption by presenting evidence of inconsis-
tency." Id. In contrast, section 107(a)(4)(B) provides that costs are recoverable if "consistent
with the NCP." Noting this difference, the court indicated that in section 107(a)(4)(B) actions,
plaintiffs had the burden of proving that their costs were consistent with the NCP. Id. See
also Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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procedures for development of a cost effective plan. 152 Thus, it appears
that the plaintiff, which after all has the best information on selection of
the cleanup alternative, will have the burden of proving that its cleanup
plan was cost effective. As discussed above, EPA has not required pri-
vate parties to notify responsible parties of their intention to clean up a
site, but has stated that such notice might be "helpful" where cost recov-
ery is sought.153 Perhaps it is in this context that such notice will be
helpful. A plaintiff might have an easier time proving that its action was
cost effective if it notified and discussed a proposed response plan with
the defendant prior to undertaking the cleanup.
It is questionable, however, whether the plaintiff in a section
107(a)(4)(B) action should bear the ultimate burden of proof on the cost
effectiveness issue. Section 107(a)(4)(B) actions do not involve Fund-fi-
nanced cleanups, in which there is a need to develop a plan that will
conserve the Superfumd. Although cost-effective hazardous waste
cleanup is a goal of CERCLA and should be promoted as a national
policy, that does not mean that the person who undertakes the cleanup
should bear the risk that the cleanup was not cost effective. A private
party might be deterred from cleanup by the prospect that post hoc judi-
cial review might conclude that the alternative it selected was not cost
effective.
Rather than placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff, perhaps
failure to undertake a cost-effective response should be an affirmative de-
fense to be pleaded and proved by the defendant.1 54 This would place the
burden of producing evidence and the risk of nonpersuasion not on the
person who actually cleaned up the hazardous wastes, but on the respon-
sible party who failed to respond to the release of the hazardous
substance.
5. Public Participation
The revised NCP contains a significant procedural requirement that
applies to private parties who are developing cleanup plans and seeking
to recover costs pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B). To act consistently
with the NCP, these parties must provide for public participation in their
selection of a remedial action.'5 5 Such public participation must be
"consistent" with the requirements of section 300.67(d), which specifies
the public participation requirements for section 106 actions. These re-
152. At a minimum, this should involve compliance with EPA procedures for documenta-
tion of and public participation in the response plan process. See Revised NCP, supra note 33,
at 47,976 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.69).
153. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
154. See infra note 222 for a discussion of possible nonstatutory affirmative defenses to
liability under section 107.




quirements include providing the public with "feasibility studies which
outline alternative remedial measures" for review and comment.' 56 This
must be done at least twenty-one days prior to selection of the remedial
response. 157 Additionally, public meetings may be required during this
period.1 58 The only exemption from this public participation require-
ment is if compliance with state or local requirements "provides a sub-
stantially equivalent opportunity for public involvement in the choice of
remedy."159
Failure to provide adequate public participation in a cleanup will
presumably preclude recovery of expenses under section 107(a)(4)(B),
and thus public participation is a significant aspect of the new require-
ments. As discussed, the public participation requirement may serve to
notify PRP's of the existence of the private cleanup effort, 160 and consid-
ering and responding to public comments may also aid private parties in
subsequently proving that their actions were otherwise consistent with
the NCP. 161 Many federal environmental statutes provide for public par-
ticipation; an open process is presumed to result in better decisions. On
the other hand, this requirement will also undoubtedly discourage
cleanup by private parties who do not want the notoriety and delay asso-
ciated with public participation. Whether the benefits of this participa-
tion will outweigh these burdens remains to be seen.
B. "Necessary Costs of Response" Under Section 107(a)(4)(B)
In addition to the requirement of "consistency with the NCP," sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B) also provides that compensation is limited to "neces-
sary costs of response." 162 CERCLA defines "response" to include
remedial and removal actions, 163 and the definitions of remedial and re-
moval actions in CERCLA indicate that a broad array of expenses are
included, ranging from constructing fences, to monitoring, to providing
alternate drinking water supplies. 164
Courts have liberally construed specific expenses as "costs of re-
sponse."' 65 One conflict that has arisen is whether preliminary expenses
156. Id. at 47,973 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.67(d)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 47,977 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(2)(ii)(D)).
160. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
163. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
164. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 850 (response costs include
government litigation costs and attorneys' fees, government salaries, and other expenses associ-
ated with monitoring and evaluating releases, costs of planning and implementing the response
action, future costs of response, and prejudgment interest); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Reilly Tar
& Chem. Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2118 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (response costs include
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involving on-site investigation and planning of cleanup efforts constitute
response costs. Because expenditure of some response costs is itself a
prerequisite to bringing a section 107(a)(4)(B) action, 166 the question of
the coverage of preliminary expenses is closely tied to the procedural
question of when an action can be brought. Parties obviously want to
bring an action, and hence determine who is ultimately liable, as early
and with as little money expended as possible. A determination that pre-
liminary expenses constituted response costs would open the door to ear-
lier determinations of liability.
The definition of "response" in CERCLA seems broad enough to
include preliminary site investigation expenses. 167 Most courts have con-
cluded that preliminary expenses, such as investigation and sampling, do
constitute response costs, 168 but several courts have held that they do
not. 169 At least one court has suggested that expenditures on preliminary
investigation, although ultimately recoverable after money is spent on
actual cleanup, are not alone sufficient to satisfy the prerequisites for
bringing a section 107(a)(4)(B) action. 170
A broad definition of the items eligible for recovery as "necessary
costs of response" is certainly consistent with the congressional intent to
encourage private cleanup efforts, and courts should allow for ultimate
recovery of even preliminary expenses when they were necessary to de-
termine the scope of the cleanup effort. To condition access to courts on
whether funds were expended in conceiving or in implementing the
cleanup plan seems arbitrary. Expenses for plan development are just as
necessary as the expenditures for implementation.
The resolution of when and whether a private party may obtain a
declaratory judgment is central to the future of private party cleanups.
As discussed below, if the courts decline to provide plaintiffs with early
determinations regarding both PRP liability and the NCP consistency of
cleanup plans, they will be placing a serious practical barrier in the path
of private parties attempting to use section 107(a)(4)(B) to clean up haz-
costs of evaluating how to deal with problem of hazardous wastes); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C.
Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984) (response costs include costs of complying with
RCRA).
166. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
167. "Response" is defined to include the "removal" of hazardous wastes. CERCLA
§ 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). "Removal" includes "such actions as may be necessary to
monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances." CER-
CLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
168. See, e.g., New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); North-
eastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. 823.
169. See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1984); D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 248 (D.N.J. 1983).
170. Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
See Note, supra note 72, at 1154.
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ardous waste sites. 17 1 For courts to cloud this issue by making fine dis-
tinctions on the question of what constitutes "necessary costs of
response" would be a mistake.
C. Standing To Assert the Cause of Action
Section 107 seems to provide a cause of action to anyone who has
expended money on a hazardous waste cleanup. Section 107(a)(4)(A)
authorizes recovery by the federal government and the states; section
107(a)(4)(B) authorizes recovery by "any other person." "Person" is
broadly defined in the Act to include virtually any individual, corpora-
tion, association, or government body. 172 The identities of parties who
have brought recovery actions confirm the apparent scope of section
107(a)(4)(B). These parties have ranged from municipalities, 173 to neigh-
bors of a hazardous waste site, 174 to water supply companies, 175 to pur-
chasers of real estate suing prior owners who had originally disposed of
wastes on the property. 176
1. Potentially Responsible Parties
One of the basic issues addressed by the courts has been whether
"potentially responsible parties," who are themselves liable for cleanup
costs, have standing to seek reimbursement. This issue is significant be-
cause in most cases the parties who have cleaned up the site and are
seeking reimbursement had a sufficient connection to the site to be
classed as responsible parties under section 107.177
This issue was first considered in City of Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chemical Co.17 8 In that case, a municipality sued for recovery of ex-
penses for the cleanup of hazardous wastes illegally dumped at a munici-
pal landfill. The city, as owner of the landfill, was a responsible party
171. See infra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
172. CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
173. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa.
1982).
174. See, e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985); Fishel v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531 (M.D. Pa. 1985); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F.
Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
175. See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Del.
1985); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 515 (D. Mass.
1983).
176. See, e.g., Mardan Corp., 600 F. Supp. 1049; Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Velsicol Chem. Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2118.
177. Because real estate purchasers will in almost all cases be responsible parties, a ruling
that they lacked standing for this reason would eliminate much of the potential litigation under
section 107(a)(4)(B). See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text. Cf New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (property owner responsible for state's response
costs).
178. 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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under section 107(a), and therefore potentially liable for the costs of
cleanup. The defendants argued that responsible parties should not be
allowed to bring such an action because, if recovery were available, this
would also allow responsible parties to claim against Superfund under
sections 111 and 112, with potentially disastrous results.
The court rejected the defendants' arguments and held that respon-
sible parties were not per se precluded from bringing section 107(a)(4)(B)
actions. The court observed that "although not a model of clarity, the
provision [section 107(a)(4)(B)] does not specifically exclude parties who
may be liable for the costs of governmental action nor does its language
necessarily support such a construction." 179 The court premised its con-
clusion in part upon the Act's purpose to encourage prompt cleanup of
sites. 180 The court also noted, however, that the city had not in this case
actually operated a hazardous waste landfill and did not authorize the
dumping of wastes on its property. 181 The court added that the city had
undertaken to clean up the site without a government order and that no
Superfund money had been expended at the site. 182
To the extent that the court suggests that only responsible parties
with very clean hands may bring a section 107(a)(4)(B) action, its hold-
ing may be rather narrow.1 83 Although some courts have cited Stepan
179. Id. at 1142.
180. Id. at 1142-43.
181. Id. at 1143. The court did conclude that the city "might have been liable" for the
governments' response costs under section 107(a)(4)(B), and stated that "[t]he City has not
seriously taken exception to the defendants' characterization of its potential liability under 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)." Id. at 1143 n.10. There is some question, however, whether the city would
have been liable. See infra note 183.
182. Id. at 1143.
183. The court stated that while the City might be liable, "the dispositive consideration is
that the City did not operate a hazardous waste disposal facility on the premises and it asserts
that it did not voluntarily permit the placement of the hazardous substances on its property."
544 F. Supp. at 1143. Under these circumstances, the city may have been able to take advan-
tage of the affirmative defense to liability provided in section 107(b)(3) relating to acts of third
persons. The defense requires that the responsible party must have taken reasonable steps to
prevent foreseeable acts and that the parties must not have had either a direct or indirect
contractual relationship. If the court impliedly limited the cause of action under section
107(a)(4)(B) to responsible parties who have an affirmative defense to liability, then the opin-
ion is more limited than it might at first appear.
In most cases, however, parties who own sites where hazardous wastes are found will
clearly be liable under section 107(a). In Shore Realty Corp., the court considered the question
of whether the purchaser of property where hazardous waste was found was a "responsible
person" under section 107(a). Holding that such a person may be subject to liability, the court
wrote:
It is quite clear that if the current owner of a site could avoid liability merely by
having purchased the site after chemical dumping had ceased, waste sites certainly
would be sold, following the cessation of dumping, to new owners who could avoid
the liability otherwise required by CERCLA. Congress had well in mind that per-
sons who dump or store hazardous waste sometimes cannot be located or may be
deceased or judgment proof. We will not interpret section 9607(a) in any way that
apparently frustrates the statute's goals, in the absence of a specific congressional
intention otherwise.
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Chemical for the simple proposition that section 107(a)(4)(B) allows re-
covery actions to be brought by responsible parties, 184 others have indi-
cated that a party responsible for generating wastes may be prevented
from suing under section 107(a)(4)(B). 185 One court has, in fact, barred
a claim for recovery of response costs because the plaintiff had partici-
pated in the generation of the hazardous wastes.1
86
Preventing potentially responsible parties, even those with "unclean
hands," from seeking compensation under section 107(a)(4)(B) would
unnecessarily limit private cleanups of hazardous wastes. First, and
most obviously, it is simply not necessary to conclude that because a
responsible party may bring an action for cost recovery against another
responsible party under section 107(a)(4)(B), that party is also entitled to
recover against the Fund. Most courts have concluded that the cause of
action under section 107 is distinct from that under sections 111 and
112.187 Although section 111 uses language similar to that of section
107, it need not be construed in the same manner. 188
Second, recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B) will presumably be an
occasion for allocation of costs among responsible parties based in part
on the relative cleanliness of their hands. As discussed below, courts are
generally finding a right of contribution among responsible parties who
are jointly and severally liable under CERCLA. Therefore, a section
107(a)(4)(B) action may be the appropriate point to allocate costs
759 F. Supp. at 1045 (citations omitted).
The court also rejected an affirmative defense to liability under section 107(b). The court
noted that the waste was placed on the site while the defendant owned the property and that
the defendant knew of the waste placement. In addition, the court suggested that the defend-
ant could not assert a defense even for wastes deposited by the former owner of the site because
the defendant had a "contractual relationship" by which it "assumed at least some of the
environmental liability of the previous owners." Id. at 1048 n.23. If the fact of purchase estab-
lishes sufficient connection with the former owner, it will never be possible to assert a "third
party" affirmative defense that it was the former owner's conduct that caused the release of a
hazardous substance.
184. See, e.g., Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 291.
185. Mardan Corp., 600 F. Supp. 1049. Cf D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 248,
253 (D.N.J. 1983) (to recover under section 107(a)(4)(B), a party must prove it is not liable for
cleanup costs).
186. See Mardan Corp., 600 F. Supp. 1049. The court found that the plaintiff's claim for
response costs under section 107(a)(4)(B) was barred, not only by the doctrine of clean hands,
but also by a purchase agreement in which the defendant had disclaimed any warranty of
merchantability or fitness for use, and had obtained a release from the plaintiff of any claims
based upon the purchase agreement or transaction pursuant to any agreement. Id. at 1058.
187. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
188. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals construed the term "emission stan-
dard or limitation" for purposes of defining the requirements for State Implementation Plans
under section 110 of the Clean Air Act differently than it did for purposes of citizen suits
under section 304 of that Act. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir.
1975). As the court noted: "if the overall purpose of Congress would be better served by con-
struing the term to include intermittent controls and tall stacks in [304(a)(1)] and to exclude
them in [110(a)(2)(B)], there is no reason this reading cannot be adopted." Id. at 1154 n.20.
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through a procedural device such as a counterclaim by the defendant.
Thus, a responsible party plaintiff may not be entitled to recover an ineq-
uitable portion of expenses for which it is also liable.189
2. Real Estate Purchasers
The availability of actions by real estate purchasers raises significant
questions about the structuring of real estate transactions.1 90 One com-
mentator has suggested that purchasers will get a windfall by paying re-
duced prices for property with wastes and then suing the seller for
recovery of cleanup expenses. 191 Although this is a potential short-term
consequence of section 107(a)(4)(B) actions, it should not constitute a
significant long-term problem. First, the marketplace will presumably
respond to the altered liability rules created by section 107(a)(4)(B) by
reflecting the possible liability of the seller in the sale price of the prop-
erty. Second, as discussed below, any recovery of expenses will presuma-
bly also take into account some offset for contribution by the plaintiff if it
is a responsible party. To the extent that such contribution allows for an
equitable distribution of expenses, a court might well consider the re-
duced purchase price by the buyer to be relevant to the issue of the
buyer's amount of the recovery in a section 107(a)(4)(B) action.
Finally, once the state of liability under section 107(a)(4)(B) is clari-
fied, parties, if they are smart, will insist upon some form of indemnifica-
tion agreement for cleanup expenses. 192 Indeed, 107(a)(4)(B) will almost
189. See infra notes 219-27 and accompanying text.
190. See generally Bleicher & Stonelake, Caveat Emptor: The Impact of Superfund and
Related Laws on Real Estate Transactions, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,017
(1984) (discussing potential liability of purchasers and difficulties they may face in collecting
part of losses from vendors).
191. See Speech by Michele Corash Before the American Bar Association Section on Nat-
ural Resources Law (Mar. 2, 1985) (on file with author).
192. Although CERCLA does not allow parties to transfer their liability to others, it does
provide that nothing in the Act "shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indem-
nify a party to such agreement from any liability under this section." § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(e)(1) (1982).
Perhaps parties should be dealing with rights of indemnity and contribution under section
107(a)(4)(B). In Mardan, the plaintiff, the current owner of a site, sued the defendant, the
party from whom it had purchased the site, for recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B) for costs it
would incur to properly dispose of hazardous wastes found there. The defendant asserted as a
defense a provision of the purchase agreement between it and the plaintiff which disclaimed
any warranty of merchantability or fitness for use of the property. The court first concluded
that such a disclaimer, although it might affect an action for breach of contract, would not
preclude an action under a statutory cause of action. 600 F. Supp. at 1055. The court also
addressed the issue of whether a settlement agreement and release could be construed as
preventing the plaintiff from asserting any cause of action it might have under CERCLA.
Reviewing the language of the settlement agreement and the intention of the parties, the court
concluded that it did in fact bar assertion of the cause of action by the plaintiff. Id. at 1057.
The court also noted that the plaintiff had participated in the production of the hazardous
wastes and was barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. Id. at 1058. See supra note 183.
Although section 107(a) specifically provides that liability is subject only to the statutory
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certainly force parties engaged in commercial activities to define contrac-
tually their respective liabilities. Contracts for sale of real estate and
other commercial agreements should increasingly contain provisions
dealing with liability for both government and private hazardous waste
cleanups. These private agreements will help avoid the problems of judi-
cial allocation of liability in suits for contribution. Private negotiation
and allocation of financial responsibility is certainly preferable to subse-
quent court-imposed obligations.
3. Neighbors
The issue of recovery actions by neighbors also raises interesting
questions. Unlike all the other major environmental statutes, CERCLA
has no express citizen suit provision. 193 Under CERCLA, a citizen may
not sue for an injunction compelling a responsible party to undertake
cleanup activities. 194 The ability to compel cleanup is limited to the gov-
ernment, primarily through section 106 orders. Section 107(a)(4)(B), by
authorizing private recovery of cleanup expenses, may, however, be
thought of as a form of citizen suit.195 At least for those citizens who are
willing to bear the initial cost of cleanup, section 107(a)(4)(B) allows
them to clean up a site, without any government intervention or order,
and attempt to recover costs from the responsible party.
D. When May the Cause of Action Be Asserted?
An issue of considerable importance to the fate of private recovery
actions concerns the point in the cleanup effort at which the action is ripe
for adjudication. Obviously, parties wishing to obtain recovery of
cleanup expenses want a determination of liability as early as possible;
parties will be more willing to undertake the expense of cleanup if the
issue of ultimate liability has been resolved.
Courts generally have been willing to allow a section 107(a)(4)(B)
action to be commenced before the entire cleanup has been completed.
Courts have held that a section 107(a)(4)(B) action is ripe for adjudica-
tion after "some" cleanup expenses have been "incurred." 196 As dis-
defenses specified in section 107(b), the court concluded that these statutory defenses were not
exclusive and that CERCLA did not preclude the use of such a contractual agreement as an
affirmative defense to liability. See infra note 222.
193. In contrast, section 304 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982)), section 505
of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982)), and section 7002 of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)), expressly authorize citizen
suits for injunctive relief to compel compliance with the requirements of the Acts.
194. See, e.g., Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1049-50; Velsicol Chem. Corp., 21 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2121-22.
195. Indeed, the district court in Walls v. Waste Resources Corp. relied on the lack of any
citizen suit provision in CERCLA to conclude that section 107(a)(4)(B) does not authorize a
private right of action. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Bulk Distribution Centers, 589 F. Supp. at 1450-53; Jones v. Inmont Corp.,
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cussed above, there has been some dispute as to the nature of the costs-
preliminary studies or actual cleanup expenses-that must be incurred
prior to commencing the action, but courts have recognized that the re-
medial objectives of CERCLA are best served by an early determination
of liability. 197
Although it seems clear that a party can, after expending "some"
money, obtain a determination that a defendant will be liable for re-
sponse costs incurred consistent with the NCP, it is much less clear at
what point a private party can actually recover expenses. Recovery is
certainly possible after the cleanup is complete. Whether parties can ob-
tain recovery as money is expended, however, is uncertain. 198 Presuma-
bly, private parties, after expending some "necessary" costs, would bring
an action to determine the liability of responsible parties and recover
costs expended to date. Subsequent actions, or amendments to the initial
action, would be filed as additional expenses were incurred. A determi-
nation that costs were consistent with the NCP would be made when the
claim for expenses was asserted. The ability to recover expenses as funds
were expended would relieve private parties of the responsibility to
"front" the cost of cleanup themselves, and responsible parties could be
forced to bear the costs of cleanup as the cleanup progressed. 199 Surpris-
ingly, the cases do not indicate whether this is being done.2°°
584 F. Supp. 1425; D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. at 253; State ex reL Brown v.
Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1315-16 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
197. As the court noted in Jones v. Inmont Corp.:
To require either the government or a private party to complete cleanup prior to
filing suit would defeat the dual purposes of CERCLA to promote rapid response to
hazardous situations and to place the financial burden on the responsible parties.
Therefore, as the plaintiff's complaint does allege that they have already incurred
some portion of the response costs necessary to clean up the site, the controversy is
sufficiently real to allow the Court to determine defendant's liability for future costs.
584 F. Supp. at 1430.
198. In its Cost Recovery Memo, supra note 15, EPA stated that "a cost recovery action
need not be delayed where the Agency establishes a multiphase response action (e.g., surface
clean up, groundwater clean up). A cost recovery action can begin before completion of the
last phase of response activity for costs expended to date and also for calculable future costs."
Id. at 2865. See infra note 200.
199. See Comment, supra note 65, at 642-44 (arguing the need for progress payments for
persons seeking recovery from Superfund).
200. Although courts have stated that section 107(a)(4)(B) actions are ripe for a declara-
tion of liability after some costs are incurred, it is unclear if the cases involved requests for
early payments of those costs. Only one reported case has involved actual recovery of early
expenses. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. 823. Northeastern Pharmaceutical con-
cerned an action for recovery of response costs by the government under section 107(a)(4)(A).
Not only did the court in that case allow for recovery of a broadly defined group of past
response costs, see supra note 165, but it also gave a declaratory judgment that defendants were
liable for all future costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the plaintiff that were not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan. The court did not, however, make a specific
determination that planned future expenses were not inconsistent with the NCP.
Virtually every reported case has involved a defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. It is not clear at what stage plaintiffs would be able to recover their expenses. See,
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Another question not yet faced by the courts is whether parties can
obtain a declaratory judgment, after expending "some" money, that the
remaining unexpended portions of their remedial plan are consistent with
the NCP. If courts only provide a determination of consistency after the
money is expended, parties will be obligated to clean up a site without
knowing whether their expenses satisfy the requirements of section
107(a)(4)(B). As discussed below, plaintiffs' inability to obtain a declara-
tory judgment that their remedial plan is consistent with the NCP is one
of the significant constraints on the use of section 107(a)(4)(B). 20
E. Relationship to Citizen Suits for Injunctive Relief
Private parties must actually spend money on hazardous waste
cleanup before a right of cost recovery arises under 107(a)(4)(B). 202 A
provision that authorized private parties to obtain court-ordered injunc-
tive relief to compel cleanup would obviously affect the use of
107(a)(4)(B). Neighbors or environmental groups, and even responsible
parties under CERCLA, might be able to compel a cleanup without hav-
ing to expend large amounts of money.
Virtually every major federal environmental statute has some provi-
sion for "citizen suits" to compel government to perform nondiscretion-
ary duties and to obtain injunctions against private parties that have
violated the statute.20 3 CERCLA does not currently have a provision
authorizing citizen suits for injunctive relief. Although both the Senate
and House have proposed bills authorizing citizen suits against persons
alleged to be in violation of CERCLA requirements, neither proposal
contains provisions for citizen suits to abate "imminent and substantial
endangerment" of human health and the environment. 2°4 Thus, appar-
ently neither bill will authorize citizen suits to compel cleanup of existing
hazardous waste sites or releases of hazardous substances.
There is, however, another statute that in effect provides the citizen
suit provision which CERCLA lacks. The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act now provides for citizen suits against past or present gen-
erators, transporters, and owner/operators of hazardous waste disposal
facilities where there is an imminent and substantial endangerment from
e.g., Fishel, 617 F. Supp. 1531; Artesian Water Co., 605 F. Supp. 1348 (also involving a motion
for summary judgment by plaintiff on the issue of liability); Homart Dev. Co., 22 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1357; Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. 283; Velsicol Chem. Corp., 21 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2118; Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425; Wals v. Waste Resources
Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1039.
201. See infra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 193.
204. Cf S. 51, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 138 (Mar. 27, 1985) (markup of S. 51, reauthoriza-
tion of CERCLA, by the Senate Committee on Environmental and Public Works); H.R. 3852,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (Dec. 5, 1985).
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disposal of such wastes. 20 5 Section 7002(a)(1)(B) of RCRA now autho-
rizes courts to order these persons to take such action "as may be neces-
sary."' 20 6 Thus, under RCRA, citizens may sue for court-ordered
cleanup where the release of a "hazardous waste" produces an imminent
and substantial endangerment. This provision authorizes citizen actions
in many situations where the government could compel cleanup under
section 106 of CERCLA.
The "imminent and substantial endangerment" citizen suit provi-
sion of section 7002(a)(1)(B) of RCRA was only recently adopted and
has not yet been interpreted by the courts. Significant questions must be
answered before the full importance of this provision is known. First,
section 7002(a)(1)(B) authorizes actions against past and present genera-
tors, transporters, and owners of "treatment storage or disposal facili-
ties" which, under RCRA, are approved and permitted hazardous waste
facilities. Will section 7002 be interpreted to allow citizens to seek to
abate releases from any site where there is a release of hazardous wastes,
or will relief only be given with respect to sites that are seeking permit
status under RCRA as a "treatment storage or disposal facility"? If the
latter holds true, then the citizen suit provision of RCRA is substantially
narrower than the scope of CERCLA. CERCLA section 106 orders
may, of course, be issued to virtually any person, and CERCLA liability
clearly extends to any person who currently owns a site where hazardous
waste is found.
Second, section 7002 authorizes a citizen suit by any "person."
Whether courts will interpret section 7002 as granting to potentially re-
sponsible parties the right to bring abatement actions remains to be seen.
Courts have had to address a similar issue with respect to section
107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA. Most of these courts have concluded that po-
tentially responsible parties may bring such actions; it is clear, however,
from the decisions that the courts acted in reliance upon specific lan-
guage in CERCLA.207 Section 7002 contains no language addressing
this issue, and there is no indication that PRP's are not "persons" enti-
tled to bring abatement acti6ns. Nonetheless, the relief to be provided by
the court is discretionary, and courts might deny the equitable relief of
injunction to parties who themselves have "unclean hands" and are liable
for injunctive relief.
Finally, although section 7002 authorizes a court to issue an order
compelling cleanup of a hazardous waste site, the section does not define
the requirements for cleanup. There may be a direct relationship here
205. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. 6972(a) (Supp. I 1984). This provision was added
by the 1984 RCRA amendments.
206. Id.
207. At least some courts have precluded cost recovery actions under section 107(a)(4)(B)
by PRP's with "unclean hands." See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
1986]
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [
between section 7002 and section 107(a)(4)(B). Undoubtedly, parties
subject to an abatement order under section 7002 will attempt to recover
all or some of their expenses from other PRP's. 20 8 To successfully re-
cover their expenses, however, parties will have to show that the cleanup
was "consistent with" the NCP.20 9 Thus, parties to an abatement action
under RCRA will certainly attempt to use the requirements for private
party cleanups under CERCLA to shape any cleanup order. How rele-
vant the fact that the cleanup plan was court-ordered under section 7002
will be to a determination that the plan was consistent with the NCP is
unclear.
One thing, however, does seem clear. Whether courts construe sec-
tion 7002 of RCRA to provide a broad right for citizens to compel
cleanup of hazardous wastes or whether such a provision is added to
CERCLA, it will not eliminate the significance of section 107(a)(4)(B).
Any abatement order will probably only lead to a subsequent action
under section 107(a)(4)(B) for compensation from other PRP's not sub-
ject to the order. Increased availability of injunctive relief may in fact
increase the use of section 107(a)(4)(B).
IV
CONSTRAINTS ON PRIVATE PARTY CLEANUPS UNDER
SECTION 107(a)(4)(B)
Even though courts are finding a fairly broad right to bring section
107(a)(4)(B) actions, at least three major practical constraints limit sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B) as an incentive to private party cleanups. Private par-
ties who undertake hazardous waste cleanups in the expectation of
reimbursement under section 107(a)(4)(B) run the risk that: (1) a court
may subsequently determine that their actions were not consistent with
the NCP; (2) a defendant may be able to seek contribution from a re-
sponsible party plaintiff; and (3) private parties will incur significant civil
and even criminal liability if the cleanup is not carried out properly.
A. Uncertainty that Expenses Are "Consistent with the NCP"
As discussed above, even when a defendant's liability is clear under
section 107(a)(4)(B), the plaintiff's recovery is limited to "necessary" ex-
penses that are "consistent with the NCP." Although current litigation
under section 107(a)(4)(B) has reached the stage at which liability has
been determined and some determinations of the scope of "necessary"
expenses have been made, no court has apparently yet ruled that specific
208. See, e.g., Mardan Corp., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (action under secion 107(a)(4)(B) to re-
cover costs of complying with government order under RCRA to close interim status disposal
facility).
209. See id. at 1054.
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expenses were, in fact, incurred consistent with the NCP.210 Courts have
merely said that they will be able to make the necessary determinations
when the time comes. 211 No court has issued a declaratory judgment
that proposed, but unexpended, funds are consistent with the NCP. In
the absence of such a judgment, private parties run the risk that expenses
they have incurred will subsequently be found not to satisfy the require-
ments of CERCLA.212
In the context of government 106 cleanup orders, courts have been
unwilling to give declaratory judgments that the government's order is
"consistent with the NCP. ' '213 The courts' reluctance is understandable
in this context. Congress' intent in adopting CERCLA was to expedite
cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Courts have been concerned that the
ability to litigate the government order prior to cleanup could frustrate
210. The court in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. did deter-
mine that government response costs were "not inconsistent with the NCP" for purposes of
section 107(a)(4)(A). 579 F. Supp. 823, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1984). See supra note 200.
211. As the court in Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. observed:
the question of consistency is a factual determination that turns on the efficacy and
cost-effectiveness of clean-up action. This factual determination cannot be made on
the basis of the pleadings but must await development of a factual record. Thus at
this time the Court expresses no opinion about the ultimate question of whether
plaintiff's response was consistent with the National Contingency Plan.
596 F. Supp. at 290 (citation omitted). See also Homart Dev. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 22
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1357 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
212. One commentator has noted that the revised NCP does provide one mechanism to
minimize this uncertainty. See Corash, supra note 191. Under the NCP, responsible private
organizations that can demonstrate cleanup expertise can obtain "certification." The new reg-
ulations provide that such certification is relevant for determination of consistency with the
NCP when parties seek to claim against Superfund. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,978 (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(c)).
The regulations do not address the relationship between certification and a finding of
consistency in the context of a section 107(a)(4)(B) action not involving a Superfund claim.
However, when action is by a certified private group it presumably will be easier to show
consistency with the NCP, and this should operate as a strong incentive to act through respon-
sible groups.
213. Courts have been reluctant to allow pre-enforcement review of section 106 orders
issued by the government. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp.
412 (D. Minn. 1985); Aminoil Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 599 F. Supp. 69
(C.D. Cal. 1984). The court in Aminoil stated:
This Court finds, however, that the structure of the statute, its legislative history and
cases construing it, demonstrate that Congress did not intend to allow judicial review
of such orders prior to the commencement of either an enforcement action under
106(b), or a recovery action under 107(c)(3). Congress plainly gave the President
authority to address situations endangering 'public health and welfare and the envi-
ronment,' and such authority necessitates broad flexibility in promptly and effectively
responding to the emergency. Allowing an alleged responsible party to challenge the
merits of a 106(a) administrative order prior to an enforcement or recovery action
would handcuff the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by delaying effective
responses to emergency situations.
Id. at 71 (citations omitted). The court in Aminoil did hold, however, that in the absence of
pre-enforcement review, the imposition of substantial penalties for violation of section 106
orders contravened due process. Id. at 76.
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this objective.214 Under section 106, the government has the authority to
compel immediate cleanup, and responsible parties can subsequently liti-
gate the propriety of the order either in an enforcement proceeding or in
an action to seek reimbursement from Superfund.215 For similar reasons,
courts have also generally concluded that the government's response
plans under section 104 are unreviewable until the government institutes
a cost-recovery action.216
This reluctance to provide a prior declaration of consistency should
not be extended to plaintiffs in private party actions under section
107(a)(4)(B). 217 An early declaratory judgment at the plaintiffs' request
would probably promote rather than frustrate the purposes of CERCLA.
First, unlike the situation with section 106 orders, private parties are
under no obligation to undertake hazardous waste cleanups. CERCLA
provides the incentive for these private cleanups, among other ways, by
providing for reimbursement from responsible parties under section
107(a)(4)(B). In the absence of an early declaratory judgment, however,
private parties would be forced to expend money without the certainty
that their expenses would be found consistent with the NCP and hence
214. See Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. 69.
215. Id.
216. In several cases, parties who were potentially responsible for the costs of government
cleanups undertaken pursuant to section 104 have sought declaratory judgments that the gov-
ernment's response action was inconsistent with the NCP. In virtually every case, the courts
have held that review of the government's action could not be obtained until the government
sued to recover its expenses. The courts' logic in all these cases arises from the underlying
objective of CERCLA to promote rapid cleanup of hazardous wastes. Litigation before
cleanup, the courts have concluded, would frustrate this intent. See Lone Pine Steering
Comm. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 600 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1985), affd, 16
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,009 (3d Cir. Nov. 22, 1985); United States v. Midwest
Solvent Recovery, No. H-79-556, slip op. (N.D. Ind. Dec. 21, 1985); United States v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 104 F.R.D. 405 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Courts have also rejected requests for declara-
tory judgments that parties would not be liable for the government's expenses. Levin Metals
Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 608 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Cotter Corp. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2231 (D. Colo. 1984);
D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 248 (D.N.J. 1983). In only one case has a court
indicated that parties potentially responsible for government costs incurred under section 104
are entitled to pre-expenditure review. J.V. Peters & Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 584 F. Supp. 1005
(N.D. Ohio 1984). See generally Clewett, Judicial Review of CERCLA 104 Cleanup Activities
Prior to Cost-Recovery Actions, 9 CHEM. & RADIATION WASTE LITIG. REP. 165 (1985).
217. Perhaps the right to obtain a declaratory judgment should be limited to the plaintiff.
It is the plaintiff who may be discouraged from undertaking a cleanup if there is no mechanism
for ensuring that its plan will be found consistent with the NCP. The defendant runs no such
risk. If a plaintiff expends money and a court determines that the expenses were not consistent
with the NCP, the defendant is not liable. Although a defendant may prefer an early determi-
nation, it would not be prejudiced by a later determination. This is especially true if a defend-
ant can argue that portions of the plan were not "cost effective." A right to a declaratory
judgment by the defendant could only unnecessarily delay a cleanup. Limiting a right of de-
claratory judgment to the plaintiff and not the defendant essentially makes the defendant's
situation under section 107(a)(4)(B) comparable to the situation under section 106 in which a
defendant is precluded from obtaining pre-enforcement review.
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be recoverable. Rather than encouraging cleanups, such a construction
of section 107(a)(4)(B) could "chill" private parties from undertaking
cleanups.
Second, because EPA has provided that no prior government ap-
proval is necessary for consistency with the NCP, the court may be the
only body that will assess the propriety of a private party's remedial
plan.218 An early declaratory judgment on the plan will at least ensure
that the court has reviewed the plan prior to the cleanup of the site.
At some point after the plaintiff fulfills the requirement that "some"
costs have been incurred, courts should consider granting declaratory
judgments that subsequent cleanup plans are consistent with the NCP.
Although provision of a declaratory judgment for private parties may, in
some cases, slow down the cleanup of a site, the government is always
free to issue a section 106 order to ensure expedited cleanup.
. Apportionment of Liability
A fundamental question under CERCLA is whether liability for
cleanup expenses can be apportioned among responsible parties.
Although every court that has considered the question has concluded
that the basic standard of liability under CERCLA is joint and several, 219
some courts have also concluded that CERCLA authorizes a right of
contribution by a party who has paid more than its equitable share.220
Thus, some courts have been willing to allow parties who have paid for a
cleanup under government order to bring an action against other respon-
sible parties for contribution for that portion of expenses that exceeded
218. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. 823; United States v. Wade, 577
F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.
Ohio 1983). See generally 1984 CERCLA Update, supra note 8. Following the Restatement's
position on joint and several liability, these courts have suggested that apportionment of liabil-
ity may be authorized if there is an appropriate basis for allocating liability among responsible
parties. See, e.g., Wade at 1338 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1964)).
Thus, the possibility exists that when the government sues for reimbursement of expenses,
responsible parties may in some cases be able to limit their liability to their appropriate allo-
cated share.
Some courts have also suggested that apportionment of liability may be possible even
when the defendants are unable to prove what portion of the wastes they contributed. See
United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v.
Stringfellow, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1905 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
220. Judge Carrigan presented a thorough analysis of the right of contribution under
CERCLA in Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo.1985). See also Wehner
v. Syntex Agribusiness Inc., 22 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1732 (E.D. Mo. 1985); United States
v. Ward, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1235 (E.D.N.C. 1984). But see United States v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1983). See generally Note, The
Right to Contribution for Response Costs under CERCLA, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345





The availability of a right of contribution raises interesting questions
when a potentially responsible party voluntarily undertakes a cleanup
and seeks reimbursement under section 107(a)(4)(B). A responsible
party plaintiff will probably not be able to recover the entire cost of
cleanup simply because that party was the one who commenced the
cleanup and was the first to get to court seeking compensation. If a right
of contribution does exist, then a responsible party plaintiff may be faced
with a counterclaim for contribution from the defendant.222 Section
221. As Judge Carrigan noted in Colorado v. ASARCO, contribution among joint
tortfeasors is premised on allowing a party to recover money paid in excess of its equitable
share. 608 F. Supp. at 1491. The Supreme Court in Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981), stated:
Recognition of the right [of contribution] reflects the view that when two or more
persons share responsibility for a wrong, it is inequitable to require one to pay the
entire cost of reparation, and it is sound policy to deter all wrongdoers by reducing
the likelihood that any will entirely escape liability.
Id. at 88.
222. The right to contribution also raises some interesting procedural questions. Certainly
a responsible party may bring a separate action for contribution against other potentially re-
sponsible parties after it has been subjected to liability. Additionally, a defendant may implead
other PRP's and file cross-claims for contribution. See, eg., Colorado v. ASARCO, 608 F.
Supp. 1484.
In the context of a section 107(a)(4)(B) action, where the plaintiff is the other PRP, the
logical procedural mechanism available to the defendant is a counterclaim for contribution
under Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A possible problem exists, however,
because the defendant's claim for contribution does not arise until after it is found liable on the
underlying section 107(a)(4)(B) action. Thus, the counterclaim is contingent upon the outcome
of plaintiff's action. Perhaps surprisingly, some courts have held that such "contingent coun-
terclaims" may not be asserted under the Federal Rules. See, e.g., Stahl v. Ohio River Co., 424
F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1970); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Schubert, 268 F. Supp. 965, 971 (E.D. Pa.1967);
Slavics v. Wood, 36 F.R.D. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc., 24 F.R.D. 230, 232 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Slaffv. Slaif, 151 F. Supp. 124, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1411 (1971).
Other courts, however, have rejected this position and allowed counterclaims in similar
circumstances. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by "Amoco Cadiz" Off Coast of France, 491 F. Supp.
161, 165 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 90 (S.D.N.Y.1973);
Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267, 272 (E.D. Va. 1973), affid, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 125 (1977); Atlantic Aviation Corp. v. Estate of Costas,
332 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp. 47 F.R.D. 341,
344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). As one court noted:
While it is true that courts have held that, the right to contribution does not mature
unless and until one has been compelled to pay damages in excess of his proportion-
ate share under a comparative negligence theory, . . . the recent trend, and more
pragmatic approach, has been to permit counterclaims for contribution.
In re Oil Spill, 491 F. Supp. at 165 (citations omitted). As Wright and Miller have noted, a
rule authorizing counterclaims "seems sound when the counterclaim is based on pre-action
events and only the right to relief depends upon the outcome of the main action." C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra, at 57.
Alternatively, "contribution" or some form of allocation of responsibility might be assert-
able as an affirmative defense under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule
permits pleading such matters as "contributory negligence" or "any other matter constituting
an avoidance or affirmative defense." One problem with this approach is that section 107(a)
specifically provides that the statutory defenses listed in section 107(a) are the exclusive de-
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107(a)(4)(B) may entitle the responsible party plaintiff to recover only
that portion which exceeds its equitable share.
How will expenses be allocated if contribution is allowed?2 23 This
problem has plagued the field and bedeviled the complex multiparty set-
tlements in which the government has participated.22 4 Bases for alloca-
tion have included the relative volumes of waste disposed of by the
parties and the relative toxicity of the wastes.2 25 Due to its simplicity,
relative volume has been preferred as a basis for allocating liability.226
fenses to liability under section 107. One court has already addressed a similar issue under
section 107(a)(4)(B). In Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz.
1984), defendants asserted that a provision in the Purchase Agreement entered into by the
parties released them from liability and constituted a defense under section 107(a)(4)(B). The
court, in response to plaintiff's argument that such a defense was not authorized under section
107(a)(4)(B), wrote:
Mardan's argument does not withstand close analysis. As defendants have suggested,
Mardan's interpretation would result in defendants being liable even if they had al-
ready paid Mardan's Section 107(a) claim in a prior lawsuit since res judicata, pay-
ment, and accord hnd satisfaction are not listed as defenses in subsection (b).
Similarly under Mardan's interpretation of the statute, defendants would not be able
to raise such defenses as statute of limitations, waiver, laches, etc. For the foregoing
reasons, the defenses listed in subsection (b) cannot be considered as exclusive.
600 F. Supp. at 1056 n.9.
Fortunately, it may not be necessary to sort out the proper procedural device, because
Rule 8(c) provides that "[w]hen a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim
or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading
as if there were a proper designation." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
223. See generally 1984 CERCLA Update, supra note 8, at 10,230-32; J. CASLER & S.
RAMSEY, supra note 8. See infra note 225.
224. See, e.g., Pain, Mega-Party Superfund Negotiations, 12 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 15,054 (1982); Graham, The Second Chem-Dyne Settlement, 15 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,208 (1985).
225. See J. CASLER & S. RAMSEY, supra note 8; Pain, supra note 224, at 15,055-56. The
Gore Amendment, passed by the House in September 1980, would have authorized courts to
apportion liability among responsible parties based on several factors, including:
(I) the ability of parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge release or
disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
(2) the amount of hazardous waste involved;
(3) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(4) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation, treatment,
storage, or disposal of the hazardous wastes;
(5) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous waste con-
cerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous wastes involved;
(6) the degree of cooperation by the parties with the federal, state, or local officials to
prevent any harm to the public health or the environment. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 3091, 126 Cong. Rec. 26,779, 26,781 (1980). Although the amendment was not adopted by
Congress, at least one court has relied upon the Gore Amendment as an indication of congres-
sional intent regarding the apportionment issue. See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578
F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
226. As one commentator noted: "In recent settlements and current settlement negotia-
tions involving numerous generators, the percent of waste volume contributed by the individ-
ual PRPs is the most important and often exclusive criterion in determining the PRP's 'fair
share' settlement contribution." Pain, supra note 224, at 15,055. See also J. CASLER & S.
RAMSEY, supra note 8, at 75 ("[m]easuring and assessing toxicity is a complex technical task.
As a result, volume has historically been the major factor in apportioning liability.")
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Most attempts at allocation have involved parties who each contrib-
uted wastes to a site. A particular problem arises when reimbursement is
sought by a real estate purchaser who is a responsible party by virtue of
owning the land, but was not responsible for disposal of any wastes at the
site. Should the owner receive 100% of cleanup expenses? Should the
extent of recovery reflect any discount in the purchase price due to the
presence of the wastes on the property? Total recovery of cleanup ex-
penses could operate as a windfall to the purchaser who obtained the
property for a reduced purchase price. 227 To the extent that contribution
represents an equitable apportionment of costs, these factors will un-
doubtedly be taken into account.
Whatever the answers to these questions may be, responsible parties
contemplating recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B) must consider the
possibility that a court will limit their recovery after allocating responsi-
bility among responsible parties.
C. Potential Liability for Improper Cleanup
Finally, a potentially significant constraint on the role of private
party cleanups is the possibility that cleanup efforts will subject the party
to liability under environmental laws such as RCRA or CERCLA. As
the revised NCP makes clear, private parties undertaking cleanups with-
out government approval are subject to all applicable federal and state
environmental statutes.2 28 A party that violates these statutes during a
cleanup is subject to possible civil and criminal penalties. For example, a
party removing wastes from a site is likely to be classified as a "genera-
tor" under RCRA, and thus would be subject to the full RCRA require-
ments, including manifesting and responsibility for disposal at a
permitted Treatment Storage Disposal Facility (TSDF).229 Similarly,
private parties are not exempt from permit requirements under federal
law, and onsite disposal of wastes would presumably require that the
party obtain a disposal permit under RCRA.230 A party that failed to
comply with permitting requirements would be subject to liability under
RCRA and CERCLA-and costs would not be recoverable because the
action was not consistent with the NCP. This is a significant problem; it
is hard to keep clean hands when handling hazardous wastes.
227. One possible resolution of this particular issue is a properly drafted provision in the
constract for sale, allocating liability. See supra note 192.
228. Revised NCP, supra note 33, at 47,977 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.71(a)(2)(ii)(D)). See supra notes 126-46 and accompanying text.
229. Any remedial action that involves the offsite transport of waste, for example, must
assure that such wastes are disposed of only in a permitted treatment facility which is in com-
pliance with subtitle C of RCRA. See CERCLA Compliance Memo, supra note 59. See also
J. ARBUCKLE, supra note 8, at 75 (discussion of requirements under RCRA applicable to
generators of hazardous wastes).
230. See J. ARBUCKLE, supra note 8, at 82.
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Additionally, private parties undertaking cleanups may subject
themselves to liability for damages. Section 107(d) of CERCLA is a
"good samaritan" provision relieving parties from liability for damages
resulting from actions taken "in accordance" with the NCP or at the
direction of the government official directing the cleanup.231 However,
as discussed above, the revised NCP permits section 107(a)(4)(B) actions
to be undertaken without government approval. Thus, if a private party
violates any applicable federal or state environmental statute, or other-
wise acts in a manner that is inconsistent with the NCP, there is no insu-
lation from liability under section 107(d) for any damage claims.
These problems alone may suffice to resolve the problem of prior
government approval; parties may be reluctant to act in the absence of a
government order because they are otherwise subject to all applicable
environmental laws and are not entitled to the protection from damage
claims contained in section 107(d).
CONCLUSION
The broad cause of action established by EPA and the courts under
section 107(a)(4)(B) makes private cleanups a significant new factor in
both commercial and environmental law. Considering the number of ex-
isting hazardous waste sites and 'the potential for future problems with
hazardous wastes, no one involved in commercial or real estate activity
can safely ignore the possibility of liability under CERCLA. As EPA
and the courts increasingly exercise their authority to compel hazardous
waste cleanups, private parties will be encouraged to act before the axe
falls. And, in every case of private cleanup, the parties will be looking
for someone to whom they can pass the costs.
In most respects, the incentive to private cleanups provided by sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B) is salutary. Private parties can undertake hazardous
waste cleanups with greater speed and at lower cost than can the govern-
ment. And, there are simply more private parties than there are govern-
ment officials. Encouraging private cleanups will certainly help resolve
the present and future problems of hazardous wastes more quickly than
if the nation were forced to rely on the resources of the government
alone.
This incentive for private cleanup is not, however, without its costs.
Unchaining private forces to begin digging up and moving hazardous
wastes does, of course, raise concerns about the environmental conse-
231. CERCLA § 107(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d) (1982). The extent of protection afforded by
section 107(d) is, however, open to question. Section 107(d) only provedes an exemption from
liability under "this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d). Thus, it does not seem to be a defense
to tort liability based on negligence or strict liability, for example. More remarkably, section
107(d) only provides a defense to liability for "damages." CERCLA defines damages as dam-
ages to natural resources only. CERCLA § 101(6), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(6).
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quences of section 107(a)(4)(B). The new revisions to the NCP rely al-
most exclusively on private judgments about complex and ambiguous
environmental standards.
Private parties, the courts, and EPA retain the power to remedy
some of the problems in implementing section 107(a)(4)(B). Private par-
ties should begin to include provisions for allocating hazardous waste
liability in contracts for the sale of land. Through these indemnification
agreements, parties will be able to negotiate with respect to liability and
thereby gain some certainty. The courts can provide for early declara-
tory judgments of the consistency of private plans with the NCP. This
will not only encourage private cleanups by relieving some uncertainty as
to subsequent recovery, and minimize potential liability for damages, but
also provide some prior supervision of cleanup efforts. EPA, the agency
responsible for environmental protection and having the greatest exper-
tise in this area, can extend its control over the cleanup process by ex-
panding requirements for government approval of cleanup plans. This
can be done under the existing NCP or by aggressive use of EPA's sec-
tion 106 authority. EPA should also consider enlarging the National
Priorities List to include a "second tier" of sites for which government
approval of cleanup plans must be sought.
Private hazardous waste cleanups and private liability for those
cleanups are now facts of commercial life. EPA, through the National
Contingency Plan, and the courts, through resolution of the early cases
under section 107(a)(4)(B), have established what those facts are.
Whether the proper balance has been struck between the need to en-
courage private responses to hazardous waste problems and the need for
proper supervision of those responses remains to be seen.
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